Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2007

Affirmative Inaction
Girardeau A. Spann
Georgetown University Law Center, spann@law.georgetown.edu

Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-172

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/802
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2174543

50 How. L.J. 611-684 (2007)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the
Race and Ethnicity Commons

Affirmative Inaction*
GIRARDEAU

A.

SPANN**

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................... ......................
I. SUNSET ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ..............
A. Twenty-Five Years ..................................
1. Rhetorical Surplus ..............................
2. Instrumental Concerns ..........................
3. Possible H olding ................................
B. The Substance of Dicta .............................
1. W hite Entitlement ..............................
2. Minority Culpability ............................
3. R acial Parity ....................................
II. INVIDIOUS EQUALITY ..............................
A. Constitutionalizing the Status Quo ..................
1. Societal Discrimination .........................
2. Prospective Neutrality ..........................
B. Inverse Discrimination ..............................
1. Through the Looking-Glass .....................
2. White Supremacy ...............................
III. NEUTRALIZING THE COURT ......................
A . Negative A ction ....................................
1. Limits on Affirmative Action ...................
2. Like Lochner ...................................
B. Affirmative Inaction ................................
1. Doctrinal Measures .............................
2. Mind Over Matter ..............................
CO NCLU SIO N ................................................

612
613
613
614
618
621
622
623
627
631
635
636
636
639
645
646
653
661
662
662
667
671
672
676
683

Copyright © 2006 by Girardeau A. Spann.
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Stephen
Cohen, James Forman, Steven Goldberg, Lisa Heinzerling, Emma Jordan, and Mike Seidman for
their help in developing the ideas expressed in this article. Research for this article was supported by a grant from the Georgetown University Law Center.
*

**

2007

Vol. 50

No. 3

Howard Law Journal
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most exasperating aspect of racial discrimination in
' the United States is the self-righteous manner in which it is practiced.
After a history of facilitating White exploitation of minority interests,
the Supreme Court intimated in Grutter v. Bollinger1 that time was
running out for racial minorities to take advantage of the opportunities for equality that the culture has offered in the form of affirmative
action. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion seemed to say that in another twenty-five years, the Court would cease to tolerate such special
favors for racial minorities, thereby leaving minorities only a limited
amount of time remaining to discover some way out of the economic,
political, and socially disadvantaged caste that they have been unable
to escape for the past four hundred years.2 There are at least three
problems with Grutter's sunset suggestion, all of which reflect the imprudence of delegating to the Supreme Court an active role in the
formulation of racial policy.
First, as Part I discusses, Grutter's twenty-five year admonition
might be intended either to serve as a mere rhetorical flourish, or to
have substantive content. Regardless of the intent with which it was
penned, the inclusion of such sunset language in the Court's opinion
conveys the impression that the Supreme Court is disinclined to do
anything meaningful to remedy the persistent problem of racial discrimination in the United States. Second, as Part II discusses, the concept of equality on which the Court's distaste for affirmative action
rests is itself discriminatory, because it favors the interests of Whites
over the interests of racial minorities. Far from reducing the general
societal discrimination that has long been the norm in United States
culture, the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has inverted the theory of racial discrimination in a way that has caused the
very concept of equality itself to become racially invidious. Third, as
Part III discusses, even when the politically accountable arms of the
culture do make efforts to promote the interests of racial minorities,
the Supreme Court appears to believe that its governmental function
is to nullify those efforts through the process of politically unaccountable judicial review. As a result, the post-Grutter agenda, for those
who favor a more meaningful conception of equality, should be to
spend the next twenty-five years promoting affirmative inaction by the
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. See id. at 343.
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Supreme Court in the realm of racial policy. This Article concludes
that the role of the Supreme Court in the formulation of racial policy
can successfully be marginalized, but only if the culture at large genuinely favors racial equality.
I.

SUNSET ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

The future of affirmative action is uncertain. Although the Supreme Court presently tolerates race-conscious affirmative action in3
very limited circumstances, a majority of the Justices in Grutter
signed an opinion suggesting that the Court might cease to tolerate
any race-conscious remedies at all in another twenty-five years.
Proper interpretation of the Grutter sunset language is subject to debate, but when paired with the Supreme Court's historical track record in discrimination cases, the Court's racial insensitivity is difficult
to mistake. Regardless of how the Court's sunset language is ultimately construed, that language connotes an unflattering view of racial minorities. It suggests that minorities are not entitled to any
meaningful degree of racial equality, and it does so in a way that is
likely to reinforce the tacit stereotypes and prejudices that many
members of the White majority already possess concerning racial
minorities.
A.

Twenty-Five Years

Grutter is the Supreme Court's reigning racial affirmative action
decision. 4 In Grutter, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a University of Michigan law school admissions program that gave positive
consideration to the race of minority applicants in order to promote
student diversity.5 Grutter held that the promotion of diversity in an
educational context could constitute a compelling governmental interest sufficient to survive strict scrutiny.6 It also held that the consideration of race as part of a narrowly-tailored, holistic admissions process
3. See id. (joining O'Connor, J., in the majority opinion are Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg &
Breyer, JJ.).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 343-44 (holding that Michigan law school program did not violate equal protection clause). On the same day, however, the Court invalidated a racial affirmative action plan
adopted by the University of Michigan undergraduate college, holding that the undergraduate
plan failed to constitute a narrowly-tailored effort to promote the state's compelling interest in
diversity, because it mechanically awarded a set number of points to applicants based on their
minority racial status. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003) (finding that Michigan
undergraduate program violated equal protection clause because it was not narrowly-tailored).
6. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323, 328-30.
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was neither a prohibited quota system, nor a "patently unconstitutional" attempt to achieve racial balance.7 However, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion went on to suggest that racial affirmative
action might cease to be constitutional in another twenty-five years.8
Emphasizing the need to avoid unfairness to the White majority,
Justice O'Connor's opinion stated:
We acknowledge that "there are serious problems of justice
connected with the idea of preference itself." [Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v.1 Bakke, 438 U.S. [265], at 298 [(1978)] ... (opinion of
Powell, J.). Narrow tailoring, therefore, requires that a race-conscious admissions program not unduly harm members of any racial
group. .

. To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions

program must not "unduly burden individuals who are not members
of the favored racial and ethnic groups."
.. . Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies must be
limited in time ....

We see no reason to exempt race-conscious

admissions programs from the requirement that all governmental
use of race must have a logical end point ....

In the context of

higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset
provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity.
...It has been 25 years since [Bakke, when] Justice Powell first
approved the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher education. Since that time,
the number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores
has indeed increased.... We expect that 25 years from now, the use
of racialpreferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today.9

This language has served as the basis for speculation about whether
the Grutter Court imposed a twenty-five year sunset provision on the
constitutional permissibility of racial affirmative action.
1. Rhetorical Surplus
The Grutter sunset language is probably best understood as dicta
rather than holding, because it was doctrinally unnecessary to the
Court's decision. Although Justice O'Connor read the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny to necessitate "a logical end point"
7. See id. at 329-30, 334-37.
8. See id. at 343.
9. Id. at 341-43 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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for affirmative action,1" she also found that the Michigan law school
affirmative action program had the requisite "'reasonable durational
limits." 1 ' Quoting from the law school's brief, she stated, "[w]e take
the Law School at its word that it would 'like nothing better than to
find a race-neutral admissions formula' and will terminate its raceconscious admissions program as soon as practicable."' 2 At that point
in the opinion, the legal analysis required to establish the Court's
holding was complete. The twenty-five year admonition seems to be
mere rhetorical surplus.
It is unlikely that Justice O'Connor viewed the imposition of a
judicial sunset provision as necessary for the constitutionality of affirmative action, because there are prior cases in which the Supreme
Court upheld affirmative action programs that lacked specific sunset
provisions without imposing judicial sunset limitations of its own.' 3
Nor is it likely that Justice O'Connor viewed the imposition of a judicial sunset provision as an appropriate way to compensate for a program's lack of the requisite durational limit, because there are prior
cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated affirmative action programs that lacked specific sunset provisions rather than trying to save
the constitutionality of those programs by imposing judicial sunset
limitations of the Court's own making.1 4 Moreover, the judicial imposition of a numerical sunset limitation to override the more functional
"logical endpoint" that Justice O'Connor found to be present in Grutter would be problematic. It would be inconsistent with the deference
to expert educational discretion that was stressed so heavily in Justice
10. See id. at 342.
11. See id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 32, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241)).
12. Id. at 343.
13. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552-63, 594-96 (1990) (upholding
minority preference without sunset provision for issuance of broadcast licenses, relying only on
periodic congressional review to limit duration); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453-54, 46872, 490-92 (1980) (upholding minority construction set aside without sunset provision, relying
only on periodic congressional review to limit duration). But cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-27, 235, (1995), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (reversing use of intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove, and remanding, where affirmative action program was
ultimately abandoned after remand).
14. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003) (invalidating student educational affirmative action program as not narrowly-tailored, without considering judicial sunset
provision to limit duration); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-20 (1995) (invalidating majority-minority voting district without considering judicial sunset provision to limit duration); cf.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204-05, 237-39 (applying strict scrutiny to minority construction set aside
without considering judicial sunset provision to limit duration).
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O'Connor's opinion as the preferred method of advancing15the state's
compelling governmental interest in educational diversity.
Characterization of Justice O'Connor's sunset comments as dicta
rather than holding is further supported by Justice O'Connor's language itself. She states, "[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the use
of racial preference will no longer be necessary,"1 6 -not we "hold"
that racial preferences will no longer "be permitted" in another
twenty-five years. By its terms, Justice O'Connor's language seems
more aspirational than mandatory. And when one reads the language
in context,17 it seems to be more of a comment about the state of race
relations in the United States than a directive concerning the imposition of future constitutional demands.
Justice O'Connor's selection of twenty-five years as the pertinent
sunset period also seems too arbitrary for something that was intended to serve as a true constitutional holding. She apparently settled on twenty-five years in order to mirror the amount of time that
had elapsed between the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Grutter
and its earlier 1978 decision in Bakke.1 8 However, there is no reason
to believe that the time lapse between Grutter and Bakke would be at
all relevant in forecasting the amount of time that will prove necessary
to secure a meaningful degree of racial equality in the future. Justice
Ginsburg points out that fifty years elapsed between Grutter and the
Supreme Court's school desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.1 9 It would, therefore, be just as symmetrical to impose a
fifty year sunset limitation on affirmative action as it would be to impose a twenty-five year limitation. Notably, the fifty years that have
elapsed since Brown have not been adequate to integrate or equalize
the quality of public schools.2" It is, therefore, unlikely that Justice
O'Connor would seriously have believed that a mere twenty-five years
would be adequate to accomplish the much more difficult task of
15. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 327-33 (discussing deference to expert educational discretion in
complex task of promoting student diversity). But see id. at 377-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (objecting to deference to educational expertise of school in selecting

means of promoting student diversity).
16. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 343 (noting that twenty-five years had elapsed since the Bakke
decision, while expressing the hope that racial preferences would no longer be necessary after
another twenty-five years).

19. See id. at 344-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing fifty year approximate time lapse
between Grutter and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
20. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 498-99 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing limited success of Brown in achieving integration of schools).

616
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achieving a meaningful degree of racial equality throughout the entire
society. Moreover, it would also be symmetrical to impose a 400 year
sunset period on affirmative action, in order to mirror the approximate time lapse that existed between Grutter and the 1619 introduction of slavery into the colonial United States through indentured
servitude. 2 When mere symmetry is one's judicial goal, it is more
likely that one is seeking to generate dicta than holding.
The fact that Justice O'Connor's twenty-five year figure has no
instrumental justification takes on added significance when it is considered in light of Justice O'Connor's actions in Gratz v. Bollinger.2 2
On the same day that Grutter was decided, Justice O'Connor signed
the majority opinion in Gratz,23 which invalidated the University of
Michigan undergraduate affirmative action program on the ground
that its use of numerical points was so mechanical that it violated the
narrow-tailoring requirement of the equal protection clause.2 4 She
further focused on what she deemed to be an arbitrary use of points in
the Gratz program as the very thing that distinguished the invalid undergraduate program from the law school program that was upheld by
her opinion in Grutter.25 However, it seems apparent that the twentyfive years alluded to in Grutter bear even less relationship to a sensible sunset period for affirmative action than the numerical point
scores, invalidated in Gratz, bore to the goal of student diversity. It is,
therefore, unlikely that Justice O'Connor would have intended to elevate her own twenty-five year language in Grutterto the level of holding. That would subject her use of twenty-five years in Grutter to the
same indictment that she herself leveled at the Michigan undergraduate program's use of numbers in Gratz-a use that she viewed as impermissibly arbitrary.
It is also doubtful that Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer-who typically vote to uphold racial affirmative action programs26-would have joined an opinion that they viewed as reading
21. Slavery in the United States now seems to have commenced in 1619, when the first
African slaves were sold as indentured servants in the colony of Jamestown, Virginia. See Lisa
Rein, Mystery of Virginia's First Slaves Is Unlocked 400 Years Later, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2006,
at Al.
22. Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
23. See id. at 247 (noting that Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist).
24. See id. at 271-76.
25. See id. at 276-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26. See GIRARDEAU A SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 159-63 (2000) [hereinafter THE LAW
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into the Constitution a severe sunset limitation on affirmative action. 27 In fact, Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Grutterstated,
"[f]rom today's vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast,
that over the next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action."2 8 Presumably, Justice Ginsburg was attempting to
guard against the very possibility that Justice O'Connor's language
might be interpreted as infusing a firm sunset requirement into the
Constitution.
2.

Instrumental Concerns

Justice O'Connor's twenty-five year language does not appear to
be connected to any instrumental justification. Justice Thomas seems
correct when he argues in dissent that it is unrealistic to suppose that
differences in academic credentials between Whites and racial minorities will disappear in the next quarter century.2 9 Affirmative action is
not new, and racial disadvantage has shown itself to be far too durable
to permit its demise within the next generation. Therefore, the modest affirmative action that the Supreme Court now allows is not likely
to produce changes more substantial in the next twenty-five years
than the incremental changes it has produced during the last twentyfive years. Nor are the underlying attitude changes, necessary to trigger a paradigm shift in racial equality, likely to be produced by
twenty-five more years of affirmative action alone. If Justice
O'Connor intended her sunset language to operate as an actual time
limit-permitting affirmative action only so long as it offered the hope
of near-term racial parity-there would have been no reason for her
to have refrained from invalidating the Grutteraffirmative action program while it was pending before the Court.3" Nothing dramatic is
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION] (discussing voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices in racial affirmative action cases); cf GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME
COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 1-82 (1993) [hereinafter RACE AGAINST

THE COURT] (discussing general hostility of Supreme Court to racial minority interests). It is
noteworthy, however, that Justice Breyer did vote to invalidate the Michigan undergraduate
program in Gratz. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281-82 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
27. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 (2003) (noting that Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinion).
28. Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
29. See id. at 375-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that nothing significant will change
in the next twenty-five years).
30. Indeed, that is precisely why Justice Thomas argued that affirmative action should be
declared unconstitutional now. See id.
[VOL.
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likely to happen in the next twenty-five years that could realistically
be recognized as the achievement of racial equality.
Finally, one might argue that Justice O'Connor was simply skeptical about the ability of affirmative action to redress racial inequities,
and that she intended to hold that affirmative action would have one
last chance to prove its constitutional worth. If such a test had been
envisioned, one would expect it to be a fair test. But any test that
Justice O'Connor might hypothetically have envisioned can hardly be
deemed fair under the circumstances. The decisions handed down
since 1989-when the Supreme Court was able to issue its first majority opinion in a racial affirmative action case-have simply been too
restrictive to comport with any serious notion of an experimental inquiry.3 1 The strict scrutiny standard applied by the court, typically resulted in the invalidation of the affirmative action programs at issue,
even when those programs were adopted by majoritarian political actors who had voluntarily chosen to accept the burdens that those programs placed on the White majority.32 If some test of affirmative
action was intended, it would necessarily have been a test that was
conducted with very little experimental data.
In addition, some of the decisions in which affirmative action programs were invalidated seem very difficult to distinguish from other
decisions in which similar affirmative action programs were upheld.3 3
This is especially true of the Grutterand Gratz decisions. Any distinction that existed between the Michigan law school and undergraduate
programs at issue in those cases is, at best, a subtle one. Seven of the
nine Justices that considered the cases concluded that the two programs before the Court were, in fact, constitutionally indistinguishable.34 And even if the two cases were distinguishable, the
31. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 44-84 (discussing Supreme
Court majority affirmative action opinions).
32. See id. at 161-89 (discussing frequent invalidations of affirmative action).
33. See id. at 164-72 (suggesting that distinctions between Fullilove, Croson, and Adarand
are traceable more to political preferences of Justices than to analytical differences). Compare
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (invalidating majority-minority voting district as unconstitutional racial gerrymander), with Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2001) (upholding
majority-minority voting district as permissible political gerrymander).
34. See Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 242-49
(2004) [hereinafter The Dark Side of Grutter] (arguing that there is no analytical distinction
between Supreme Court decision upholding law school affirmative action program in Grutter
and Supreme Court decision invalidating undergraduate affirmative action program in Gratz);
see also Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 652-56 (2005)
[hereinafter Neutralizing Grutter] (suggesting that Grutterand Gratz programs are indistinguishable in their efforts to promote racial balance); cf. Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't
Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007) (arguing that the
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undergraduate program that the court invalidated in Gratz was, at
least, arguably on firmer constitutional ground than the law school
program because the undergraduate program required less consideration of race than the law school program did." If some final test of
affirmative action were truly intended, it would have made sense for
the Court to uphold both the Grutterand the Gratz programs, in order
to determine which would offer the more promising strategy for eliminating the need for affirmative action in the next twenty-five years.
Interestingly, the Court was often led by Justice O'Connor herself
when issuing the decisions that invalidated affirmative action during
this period.36 Some of her decisions seem too artificial in the rigor
with which they applied strict scrutiny to have been intended as part
of an experimental test of affirmative action. For example, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.3 7
expressed skepticism about whether there had ever been racial discrimination in the Richmond, Virginia construction trades, despite
stark statistical evidence showing the virtual exclusion of all racial minorities from Richmond construction contacts.3 8 Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Adarand Constructors v. Pefia 39 also seemed to
reject even the suggestion that racial minorities were socially and economically disadvantaged. Adarand concerned two federal statutes
that provided financial incentives for contractors to hire socially and
economically disadvantaged subcontractors-something that the
Court viewed as perfectly permissible. The provision of the statutes
that Justice O'Connor found troubling did nothing more than establish a presumption that racial minorities remain among those who are
socially and economically disadvantaged. Not only does such a presumption seem self-evidently correct over the range of cases, but even
this mild presumption was rebuttable by evidence that a particular
contractor in a particular case was not in fact disadvantaged. a
invalidated Gratz affirmative action program was actually more narrowly-tailored than the Grutter program that the Supreme Court upheld).
35. See The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 34, at 242-49 (arguing that the program in
Gratz required more consideration of race than the program in Grutter).
36. See infra note 105 (discussing the leadership role of Justice O'Connor in rejecting general "societal discrimination" as a permissible target of affirmative action).
37. 488 U.S. 469, 469 (1989).
38. See id. at 498-508.
39. 515 U.S. 200 (1995), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).
40. See id. at 205-09, 223-28, 237-39 (applying strict scrutiny to rebuttable presumption that
racial minorities qualified for construction contract preference given to socially and economi-
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It also seems relevant in establishing Justice O'Connor's intent to
remember that, prior to Grutter, she had never voted to uphold the
merits of a racial affirmative action program in the fourteen such cases
that she had considered.4 1 If Justice O'Connor had been genuinely
motivated by a desire to test the effectiveness of affirmative action as
a remedy for the forms of racial discrimination that have persisted in
the United States, it seems that she would at least occasionally have
permitted some affirmative action plans to take effect, if for no other
reason than to acquire the data necessary to make such a test meaningful. Justice O'Connor's single vote in favor of affirmative action
hardly seems sufficient to support the conclusion that she intended
Grutter to announce some final test for the constitutionality of affirmative action.
3.

Possible Holding

Although I believe that Justice O'Connor's twenty-five year sunset language in Grutter was intended to be mere dicta, it nevertheless
remains possible that this language will ultimately be read as announcing an operational limitation on the constitutionality of affirmative action. She preceded her twenty-five year language with a discussion of
the need to impose time limits on the scope of affirmative action, in
order to reduce the burdens that would otherwise be imposed on the
White majority."2 Moreover, Justice Thomas treated Justice
O'Connor's language as substantive rather than rhetorical in his Grutter opinion (concurring in part and dissenting in part). He concurred
in "the Court's holding that racial discrimination in higher education
43
admissions will be illegal in twenty-five years.""
Presumably, there is some point at which Justice O'Connor would
cease to tolerate even limited Supreme Court endorsements of affirmative action, and perhaps twenty-five years actually does represent the
cally disadvantaged contractors). The preference was ultimately abandoned on remand. See
Adarand Constructors v. Minetta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).
41. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 159-63 (discussing voting record of Justice O'Connor in racial affirmative action cases). The two pre-Grutter merits decisions in which Justice O'Connor's vote was even arguably sympathetic to a racial affirmative
action program still stopped short of upholding racial affirmative action. See Easley v. Cromartie 532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2001) (holding that a redistricting plan resulted from a political rather
than a racial gerrymander); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 548-54 (1999) (holding that summary judgment was not appropriate in a redistricting case where racial motivation was a disputed issue of fact).
42. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341-43 (2003) (discussing need to limit burden on nonminorities).
43. See id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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point in time when her patience is likely to have been exhausted.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor is no longer on the Court,4 4 which means
that her Gruttersunset language is now available for strategic citation
by other Supreme Court Justices. In future cases, other Justices may
be tempted to use Justice O'Connor's sunset language to advance
their own judicial agendas, operating free from any constraints on interpretation that might have accompanied Justice O'Connor's continued presence on the Court.
As noted above,4 5 Justice Ginsburg apparently thought that the
possibility of interpreting Justice O'Connor's twenty-five year language as a substantive limitation was high enough to warrant the inclusion of a cautionary disclaimer in Justice Ginsburg's own
concurring opinion.4 6 The likelihood that Justice O'Connor's sunset
language will be viewed as substantive, rather than rhetorical, is at
least high enough to be taken seriously as a topic for discussion in this
symposium. Ultimately, however, it does not matter whether the
Grutter twenty-five year sunset language is deemed to be holding or
dicta. The subtle damage that the sunset language inflicts on the continuing quest for racial equality is potent enough to persist either way.
B.

The Substance of Dicta

It seems unlikely that Justice O'Connor actually believed that racial parity in the allocation of societal resources could be achieved
within the next twenty-five years. The question that leaps to mind,
therefore, is why Justice O'Connor would choose to include the
twenty-five year language in her Grutter opinion.4 7 Whether intended
as holding or as dicta, Justice O'Connor's sunset language was presumably intended to have some effect. She must have wanted someone to act differently, or to think about things in a different way, than
they would have if the sunset language had not been included in her
opinion. So what then was the effect that she intended? At least
three troubling possibilities arise. First, Justice O'Connor may have
44. Justice O'Connor was replaced on the Supreme Court by Justice Samuel Alito. In addition, Chief Justice William Rehnquist was replaced by Chief Justice John Roberts. See Joan
Biskupic, Few Big Rulings as Justices Felt Out New Roles: Addition of Two Members, Rising
Influence of a Third Left Court in Caution Mode, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, at 9A (discussing
effect of new Supreme Court Justices).
45. See supra text accompanying note 28.
46. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (asserting that Justice O'Connor's
twenty-five year sunset language expressed a "hope" rather than a "firm forecast" that affirmative action would soon cease to be necessary).
47. See supra text accompanying note 9 (quoting Grutter sunset language).
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sought to reassure disenchanted Whites by reinforcing their historical
sense of racial entitlement. Second, Justice O'Connor may have
wished to convey the impression that it is racial minorities themselves
who are primarily responsible for the continuing inability of minorities
to overcome the disadvantages produced by prior discrimination.
Third, Justice O'Connor may have wanted to establish that affirmative
action is simply unrelated to the goal of achieving racial parity in the
allocation of resources. All three possibilities are unfortunate, because all three seem likely to perpetuate rather than ameliorate racial
inequality.
1. White Entitlement
Justice O'Connor's twenty-five year language serves to convey
the impression that the clock is running down on affirmative action,
but it is not clear why one would want to abandon affirmative action
while racial discrimination remains persistent. There can be little
doubt that racial discrimination continues to be a serious problem in
the United States. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Gratz emphasizes the many ways in which minorities continue to be the victims
of both overt and subtle forms of racial discrimination in matters ranging from education, to employment, to housing, to the receipt of medical care. a8
Although affirmative action has become politically controversial,
there can also be little doubt that it constitutes a sensible strategy for
attacking the problem of discrimination. It provides, at least, some
antidote to the forms of racial discrimination that cannot be eliminated simply by adhering to a policy of prospective race neutrality.4 9
48. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing statistics showing
disadvantages suffered by racial minorities).
49. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998) (arguing that affirmative action has been successful in educational contexts); Richard 0. Lempert et
al., Michigan's Minority Graduatesin Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 395 (2000) (same). But see Richard Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative
Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2005) [hereinafter Systemic Analysis]

(arguing that Blacks are, on balance, systemically disadvantaged by affirmative action because
they are admitted to law schools from which they do not have the academic ability to succeed,
thereby ultimately producing fewer Black lawyers than would be produced in the absence of
affirmative action). The Sander's "mismatch hypothesis" is quite controversial and has generated extensive responses. See e.g., Ian Ayers & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (2005) (arguing that there are
methodological flaws in Sander's analysis, and that affirmative action produces more Black lawyers than would be produced without affirmative action); David L. Chambers et al., The Real
Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of
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Prospective neutrality does nothing to compensate for the present dis-

advantages suffered by racial minorities. It simply freezes existing inequalities that were produced by centuries of prior discrimination.
Affirmative action, however, is intended to neutralize the head start
that Whites received in the race against minorities for access to socie-

tal resources. Although affirmative action has not yet enabled minorities to catch up to Whites-and although it will not do so in the next
twenty-five years-it has nevertheless been successful in reducing the

competitive disadvantages that racial minorities have historically suffered. This has been particularly true in the contexts of education,5"

employment, 51 and voting rights.52 Although some have questioned
the likelihood that affirmative action may be harmful to racial minorities because it provides them with opportunities that they are not
qualified to take advantage of,53 those arguments have been largely
discredited, 5" and they ultimately seem to rest on veiled notions of
White supremacy.5 5

Richard Sander'sStudy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855 (2005) (same); Michele Landis Dauber, The Big
Muddy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1899 (2005) (arguing that methodological flaws in Sander's study are
so serious that they generated debate about the study itself rather than about affirmative action);
David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage:A Response to Sander, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1915 (2005) (arguing that Sander's study fails to consider significant advantages
flowing to Blacks from receipt of elite law school degrees); cf. Richard A. Sander, A Reply to
Critics, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2005) [hereinafter Reply] (arguing that Sander's study is valid
despite asserted methodological critiques).
50. See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 49 (discussing success of affirmative action in educational contexts); Lempert et al., supra note 49 (same).
51. See, e.g., Eric A. Tiles, Lessons From Bakke: The Effect of Grutter on Affirmative Action
in Employment, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451 (2004) (discussing effect of Supreme Court
affirmative action decisions on employment).
52. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 676 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that majority-minority redistricting plan challenged in Shaw had permitted North Carolina to
send its first Black Representative to Congress since Reconstruction); cf. Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 938 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that it was not until 1972 that Georgia was
able to send its first Black Representative to Congress since Reconstruction).
53. See, e.g., Systemic Analysis, supra note 49 (arguing that affirmative action is, on balance,
bad for Blacks).
, 54. See, e.g., Ayers & Brooks, supra note 49; Chambers et al., supra note 49; Dauber, supra
note 49; Wilkins, supra note 49.
55. Wilkins, supra note 49, at 1916-17. Sander's argument ultimately seems to rest on the
assumption that Blacks are not as well equipped as Whites to take advantage of the educational
opportunities that law school offers. However, that should not cause one to oppose affirmative
action. Rather, it should cause one to be more in favor of affirmative action that is designed to
compensate minorities for past educational inadequacies. One would be opposed to offering
minorities the affirmative action opportunities that are routinely offered to Whites based on
geography, athletic ability, or alumni parentage only if one thought that minorities were less able
than Whites to take advantage of those opportunities-which, of course, is simply a form of
White supremacy.
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Given that racial discrimination continues to be a serious problem, and that affirmative action continues to be one of the most promising strategies for addressing that problem, Justice O'Connor's
apparent desire to truncate the remedial benefits of affirmative action
requires some explanation. It is possible that Justice O'Connor's sunset language in Grutterwas intended to provide a measure of reassurance to those members of the White majority who resent what they
deem to be the unfair burdens imposed upon them by affirmative action-burdens such as the allocation of law school seats to racial minorities rather than to Whites in Grutter.5 6 Justice O'Connor may
have wanted to comfort disgruntled Whites, by letting them know that
she sympathized with their concerns, and that they would not have to
endure the supposed burdens of affirmative action indefinitely. 7 That
reading of Justice O'Connor's sunset language is arguably consistent
with her more general insistence that affirmative action should be subject to strict equal protection scrutiny-even when affirmative action
is adopted by the White majority to impose burdens on itself.5 8 An
attempt by Justice O'Connor to retain a long term connection to her
political and ideological base while upholding a program of which her
constituents disapprove might at first seem like a largely costless strategy. 59 However, it has the adverse effect of both reinforcing and legitimizing the perceptions of unfairness experienced by Whites who
consider themselves to be victimized by racial preferences. Moreover,
the legitimation of those perceptions seems like the opposite of what
one would expect from a Supreme Court Justice who was in the process of upholding the constitutionality of affirmative action.
One of the most stubborn obstacles to the achievement of racial
equality in the United States has been the sense of entitlement that
traditionally characterizes White resistance to discrimination reme56. The named plaintiffs in Grutter and Gratz felt so unfairly treated by the University of
Michigan affirmative action plans that they have since become vocal sponsors of the 2006 Michigan Civil Rights Initiative ballot proposal that would amend the Michigan Constitution to ban
affirmative action. See Dawson Bell, Affirmative Action Ban Up to Voters Now: Battle Over
Change to State Constitution Likely to Be Tough One, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 31, 2006 (final
ed.), at 1 (discussing active participation by Grutter and Gratz).
57. Justice O'Connor has expressed some concern for the burden that affirmative action
imposes on Whites, although she has not been particularly outspoken on this issue. See THE
LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 174.
58. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995) (discussing "consistency" requirement of equal protection, which demands strict scrutiny even for plans that burden
the White majority).
59. Cf. infra, note 208 and accompanying text (suggesting that Chief Justice John Marshall
made a similar political move in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803)).
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dies.6" That sense of White entitlement has frustrated efforts to abolish slavery, 6 abandon de jure segregation,6 2 integrate the public
schools,6 3 and invalidate anti-miscegenation laws.64 Now that same

sense of entitlement is being invoked to frustrate contemporary affirmative action. 6 1 Rather than reinforce that persistent sense of

White entitlement, one might expect a Supreme Court that was genuinely interested in promoting racial equality to seek ways to combat it.
Justice O'Connor could have chosen to emphasize that feelings of

White entitlement are unjustified because they are typically rooted in
little more that the momentum of past discrimination. When Whites
60. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1710-15 (1993)
(arguing that Whiteness is viewed as a property right entitlement).
61. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that Blacks could not
be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of establishing
diversity jurisdiction and invalidating a congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery as
interfering with property rights of slave owners).
62. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1869) (upholding separate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities).
63. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (Brown I) (rejecting separatebut-equal doctrine and declaring official school segregation to be unconstitutional); cf Brown H
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (tempering effect of Brown I by declining to order immediate school
desegregation, and instead requiring desegregation "with all deliberate speed"); see also Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow inter-district judicial remedies
for school segregation, thereby permitting suburban schools to remain predominantly White and
inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly minority).
64. In Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam), and Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891
(1955) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court was asked to hold unconstitutional a
Virginia miscegenation statute that had been upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Virginia decision and remanded for clarification
of the record. Naim, 350 U.S. at 891. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, merely
reaffirmed its earlier decision and refused to clarify the record. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849,
850 (1956) (per curiam). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court declined to recall or
amend the mandate, finding that the constitutional question had not been "properly presented."
This allowed the Virginia court's decision to remain in effect. Naim, 350 U.S. at 985. Because
the neutrality principle that had been announced in Brown seemed to make the Virginia miscegenation statute unconstitutional, and because the Supreme Court's failure to resolve Naim on
the merits also seemed to violate a federal statute giving the Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction over the case, the Supreme Court's actions in Naim v. Naim have been vigorously criticized.
See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964) (noting that "there are very
few dismissals similarly indefensible in law"); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (noting that dismissal of the miscegenation
case was "wholly without basis in the law"). The Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the Virginia miscegenation statute as a manifestation of White supremacy eleven years later in Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967), when only 16 states still had miscegenation statutes on the
books. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6.
65. Supreme Court affirmative action opinions often express concern for the burden that
affirmative action imposes on innocent Whites. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra

note 26, at 173-76 (discussing burden on innocent Whites). However, it is only a sense of White
entitlement that could cause one to think of Whites, who benefited from a history of prior discrimination, as "innocent."
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surpass racial minorities in areas ranging from LSAT scores to country
club memberships, they are often simply capitalizing on the socioeconomic advantages that they receive in a culture that has long given
Whites a more privileged status than it has given to racial minorities.6 6
Justice O'Connor could also have chosen to debunk the common belief that affirmative action burdens Whites, by stressing the fact that
such a view is more perceived than real. Although affirmative action
provides a moderate statistical benefit to racial minorities as a group,
the burden that affirmative action imposes on Whites as a group is
statistically negligible.67 Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor's sunset language in Grutter bypassed the opportunity to challenge the counterproductive feelings of White entitlement that have long remained
ubiquitous in United States culture. Instead, Justice O'Connor chose
to feed these feelings by treating affirmative action as something that
must be terminated "as soon as practicable," 6 even if no meaningful
level of racial equality has yet been achieved.
2.

Minority Culpability

To the extent that Justice O'Connor's opinion reinforces the notion that affirmative action is unfair to Whites, it also conveys a corollary message to racial minorities. It suggests that the benefits
minorities receive from affirmative action programs are undeserved
and illegitimate, because those benefits are conferred in a way that
deviates from the merit- or seniority-based standards that we customarily use to allocate societal resources.6 9 It tells racial minorities that
they are being accorded special rights, rather than equal rights.7 ° As a
result, it also implies that minorities can no longer legitimately feel
66. For example, the history of segregated schools and residential segregation has almost
certainly contributed to present inequalities in the educational attainments of White and minority students. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 488-500 (discussing past segregation and present educational inequalities).
67. Where there are both a large number of applicants for a limited number of opportunities and a large number of White applicants relative to the number of minority applicants, affirmative action will significantly increase the probability that particular minority applicants will
be admitted to a program. However, the abolition of affirmative action will not significantly
increase the probability that particular White applicants will be admitted to the program. See
Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions,
100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1045-50 (2002).
68. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
69. See RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 26, at 173 (discussing argument that affirmative action stigmatizes minorities).
70. See Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination
Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 564-68 (1998) (discussing opposition to antidiscrimination legislation
perceived to grant special rights to protected groups).

2007]

Howard Law Journal
mistreated, but should instead be appreciative of the sacrifices that are
being made for them by a White majority that is willing to deviate
from the principle of race neutrality in order to give minorities the
benefits of affirmative action. So understood, Justice O'Connor's sunset language serves to instruct racial minorities that they cannot expect to continue as the "special favorites" of the law forever.7 1 If
minorities cannot manage to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps within the next twenty-five years, their perpetually disadvantaged status will have become a plight of their own making.
Accordingly, racial minorities will thereafter be estopped from demanding any additional favors from the White majority.
Unlike the message of reassurance that Justice O'Connor sends
to disgruntled Whites, the message she sends to racial minorities is a
message of impatience. It puts racial minorities on notice that they
had better take advantage of the affirmative action benefits that have
been offered to them before it is too late. There is, of course, nothing
wrong with encouraging racial minorities to take full advantage of the
opportunities for advancement that are presented to them. Indeed,
when racial minorities are conferring among themselves, vigorous admonitions about the appropriateness of minority independence and
self-determination seem particularly appropriate.7 2 However, when
racial minorities are blamed for their own disadvantages by a White
majoritarian institution, the message is far more suspect. 73 The Supreme Court is itself so heavily implicated in the creation and perpetuation of racial minority oppression that impatient admonitions from
Justice O'Connor are likely to seem like little more than another itera74
tion of the Court's racial insensitivity.
Aside from suspicions that may exist about Justice O'Connor's
true motivation, the message of impatience implicit in her sunset language is itself simply inapposite. It might make sense to be irritated
by the continuing inability of minorities to overcome their discrimina71. Shortly after the abolition of slavery, Justice Bradley stated, "[w]hen a man has
emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws." The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
72. See, e.g., RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 26, at 1-6 (arguing that racial minori-

ties are more likely to advance their interests through the political process than by relying on
Supreme Court protection).
73. "Blaming the victim" is often suspect in the culture at large. See Wikipedia, Victim
Blaming, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blaming-the-victim (last visited May 28, 2007).
74. See infra Part II (discussing Supreme Court implication in racial discrimination).
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tory disadvantages if the achievement of racial equality were within
the control of racial minorities. But it is not. The primary reason that
racial minorities are economically, politically, and socially disadvantaged is that minorities are discriminated against in the allocation of
societal resources." Blaming racial minorities for the culture's continuing discrimination against racial minorities is simply nonsensical.
The premise that affirmative action is objectionable because it
deviates from neutral allocation principles is also problematic. To the
extent that preferences have been used to deviate from the allocation
of resources based on merit or seniority, those preferences have been
used to benefit Whites to a greater degree than they have been used
to benefit racial minorities. The manner in which legacy, athletic, and
geographic preferences have dwarfed racial preferences in college admissions provides only the most obvious example. 76 As a result, discrimination against racial minorities not only exists in the
maldistribution of resources that gives rise to the need for affirmative
action, but also in the application of affirmative action itself. Although a range of cultural preferences deviate from the abstract principles of merit and seniority, only racial preferences have generated
any significant degree of political or constitutional opposition.7 7
For example, affirmative action in the form of ethnic preferences
is a common way for minority groups to assimilate into mainstream
culture, and to increase their economic and political power in the
United States. Political patronage by Irish, Italian, Jewish, and other
immigrant groups has historically been a staple of ethnic cultural advancement.7 8 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co, 79 however, the
75. See supra text accompanying note 49 (discussing continuing discrimination against racial
minorities).
76. See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 965 (1996) (noting that more students are admitted to Harvard each year
through legacy preferences than through all racial affirmative action preferences combined); see
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367-68 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that legacy
preferences undermine meritocracy in higher education admissions).
77. Note that gender segregation and remedial affirmative action also remain controversial
in some contexts, although typically without the asserted affront to meritocracy that is often
attributed to racial affirmative action. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(invalidating exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute).
78. See David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
25-31 (arguing that political patronage is traditionally used as an accepted means for ethnic minority advancement, but such patronage is viewed as illegitimate when used for the advancement
of racial minorities); see also Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 108 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (favoring political patronage for ethnic minorities but not racial patronage for racial
minorities).
79. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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Supreme Court invalidated a Richmond, Virginia racial minority setaside program for municipal construction contracts. In holding the
set-aside program to be unconstitutional, Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion stressed that the population of Richmond was 50% Black, and
that five of the nine City Council members were Black.80 The fact
that the program passed by a vote of 6-3 suggests that it was not the
mere product of racially motivated political patronage.8 But even if
it were, the Nation's historical tolerance of ethnic patronage makes it
unclear why Justice O'Connor should view the potential for racial patronage as unconstitutional.8 2 This is particularly true given that race
and ethnicity are typically treated as analogous for equal protection
purposes.8 3
Justice Ginsburg made a similar observation concerning the use
of race and ethnicity in drawing voter redistricting lines. In Miller v.
Johnson,8 4 the Supreme Court invalidated a remedial majority-minority voting district in Georgia that was adopted in order to comply with
the provisions of the Voting Rights Act that are designed to guard
against minority vote dilution.8 5 In her dissenting opinion, Justice
Ginsburg criticized the Court for invalidating the remedial voting district, arguing that the majority Black district at issue should not be
treated differently from ethnic voting districts that have been recognized as valid, even though they group Irish or Italian voters
together.8 6
Justice O'Connor's sunset language in Grutter not only suggests
that racial minorities have been remiss in capitalizing on the opportunities for advancement that the White majority has made available in
the form of affirmative action, but it also applies a more demanding
constitutional standard to racial affirmative action than it does to the
80. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (discussing racial
makeup of Richmond City Council).
81. See id. at 554-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing Richmond City Council vote); J.A.
Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1362-64 (4th Cir. 1987) (Sprouse, J., dissenting)
(same).
82. See Strauss supra note 78 (discussing ethnic patronage); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 555
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that deference to patronage by White municipal leaders but
not Black municipal leaders constitutes racial discrimination).
83. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (treating race
and ethnicity as analogous); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (endorsing
Powell's treatment in Bakke of race and ethnicity as analogous).
84. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
85. See id. at 915-27 (describing and invalidating redistricting plan).
86. See id. at 945-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (rejecting distinction between racial and ethnic voting districts in recognizing what constitutes a constitutionally permissible community of
shared interests for redistricting purposes).
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forms of affirmative action that benefit Whites. This is true even
though both forms of affirmative action utilize preferences that deviate from the supposedly neutral principles of merit and seniority. As
such, Justice O'Connor's sunset language contains connotations of racial inferiority that are impliedly directed to racial minorities. Racial
minority interests are simply worth less than the interests of the White
majority, as evidenced by the fact that only minority racial preferences
are subjected to heightened constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, Justice
O'Connor's twenty-five year language has the effect of misdirecting
any judicial incentive that exists for eliminating discrimination. Because it is Whites rather than racial minorities who are primarily responsible for the perpetuation of racial discrimination, it should be
Whites rather than racial minorities, who are be subject to the primary
incentive for terminating that discrimination. Neither the message of
reassurance that Justice O'Connor offers to Whites, nor the message
of impatience that she delivers to racial minorities, seems to make
much sense, because affirmative action is neither unfair to Whites, nor
illegitimate in its provision of benefits to minorities. As a result, Justice O'Connor's sunset intimation seems more pernicious than helpful.
It also seems to miss the point of affirmative action.
3.

Racial Parity

The purpose of affirmative action is to help remedy discrimination against racial minorities by making some effort to approximate
the culture that would exist in the absence of the Nation's long history
of racial discrimination. Accordingly, it is not clear why Justice
O'Connor would believe that affirmative action could properly be terminated after another twenty-five years, given that racial minorities
are unlikely to have secured any meaningful degree of parity in the
allocation of societal resources within that time. Justice O'Connor's
sunset language, therefore, seems to detach affirmative action from
the goal of racial parity in a way that is particularly troubling. If affirmative action is not intended to promote racial parity, it is difficult
to imagine what the goal of affirmative action might be-unless affirmative action is intended to be something whose function is more
cosmetic than real.8 7 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor's sunset lan87. Justice Thomas has referred to the use of affirmative action by elite educational institutions to promote diversity as "aesthetic" to emphasize his belief that its function is more cosmetic than substantive. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (characterizing
law school interest in affirmative action as "aesthetic").
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guage raises the possibility that the Supreme Court's tolerance for affirmative action is designed primarily to temper the demands that
minorities can make for racial justice, by forcing minorities to settle
for something less than actual equality.
Affirmative action was originally conceived as a strategy for reducing ongoing racial discrimination. It grew out of the recognition
that mere conscious adherence to a regime of prospective race neutrality would not produce a racially just society.8 8 The Supreme Court
has since held that the goals of affirmative action can be constitutionally pursued by compensating minorities for identifiable acts of past
discrimination, or by promoting prospective racial diversity in certain
social roles for which past discrimination has left minorities underrepresented.89 The one thing that the Supreme Court has been adamant about, however, is the impermissibility of using affirmative
action to promote racial parity. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Grutter stated that the use of affirmative action to assure "'some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race
or ethnic origin' . . . would amount to outright racial balancing, which
is patently unconstitutional."9 0
If the Constitution does not permit the conscious pursuit of racial
parity in the allocation of societal resources, the best that racial minorities can hope for is an incremental change in their economic, political, and social status. Incremental change may be appropriate for
social problems that are too minor to warrant major adjustments in
settled expectations, or for social problems that cannot be addressed
in a more effective manner. But racial discrimination is not such a
problem. Racial discrimination in the United States is so pervasive
and persistent that it cannot be solved without a major adjustment in
settled expectations. Moreover, the conscious pursuit of racial parity
is likely to be the only effective strategy that exists for promoting ra88. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 449-50 (1959-1963), reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1276 (1961) ("The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or
applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will
take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated
during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin." (emphasis
added)); see also Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 404 n.6 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing
evolution in use of term "affirmative action").
89. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 168-69 (discussing permissible

goals for affirmative action); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323, 328-30 (holding that diversity is
permissible goal for affirmative action).
90. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 330 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 307 (1978)).
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cial justice in a nation whose race-relations history is as bad as that of
the United States.
The United States has discriminated against racial minorities in
ways that are both dramatic and enduring throughout its history.
From Indian genocide, slavery, and the Chinese Exclusion laws, to
contemporary discrimination in education, employment, and housing,
the United States has insisted on enforcing the subordinate social status of racial minorities.9 Even the present war on terror, which dominates the headlines in our daily newspapers, is fueled by racial
discrimination. Our counterterrorism strategies depend heavily upon
the disproportionate imposition of burdens on Arabs and Muslims in
ways that are reminiscent of the atrocities inflicted on JapaneseAmericans, which we supposedly learned to condemn after Korematsu.9 2 The United States is addicted to racial discrimination, and
only a serious shock to its discriminatory system will ever permit the
United States to overcome this addiction.
The conscious pursuit of parity in the implementation of affirmative action might provide the necessary shock to the system. By focusing on resource allocation results, rather than intractable inquires into
the elusive concept of discriminatory intent, the culture's apparent inability to view racial minorities as equal to Whites will become less
relevant. More equitable allocations of resources will become possible through direct action, even if the White majority continues to harbor feelings of minority inferiority. Prejudice is bad, but
discrimination is worse, and the conscious pursuit of racial parity can
help to marginalize the influence of discrimination on resource
allocation.
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor reads the Constitution as actually
prohibiting the very type of paradigm shift in the culture's understanding of racial discrimination that is necessary to produce any
meaningful level of equality. By detaching affirmative action from its
most promising resource allocation strategy, she demands that affirmative action forever remains a band-aid rather than a cure. Unlike

91. See Girardeau A. Spann, Terror and Race, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 89, 106-09 (2005) (discussing historical and contemporary racial discrimination).
92. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1944) (upholding World War II exclusion order directed at Japanese Americans); see also Spann, supra note 91, at 89-91 (arguing that
war on terror discriminates against Arabs and Muslims, whose interests are discounted in the
way that we customarily discount the interests of racial minorities).
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many other conservative Justices on the Supreme Court,93 Justice
O'Connor has never been willing to rule out the constitutionality of
affirmative action completely.9 4 Even though the Michigan law school
program she voted to uphold in Grutter is the only racial affirmative
action program whose merits she has ever found to be constitutional,95
Justice O'Connor has insisted that racial affirmative action has a constitutionally acceptable, limited role to play in formulating the Nation's race-relations policy. In one respect, however, Justice
O'Connor's band-aid may be worse than the wound to which it is affixed. Most conservative opponents of affirmative action on the Supreme Court are at least willing to put racial minorities on notice that
they can expect no meaningful assistance from the Court in the quest
for racial justice. That realization, in turn, might spark racial minorities to seek other, politically more destabilizing means of prompting
the needed paradigm shift in the Nation's understanding of racial justice. 96 However, Justice O'Connor's refusal to rule out the permissibility of affirmative action may serve the function of a steam release
valve on a pressure cooker. For the next twenty-five years, it may
serve to dampen the appeal of political activism by holding out at least
the theoretical possibility of judicial alternatives to the more destabilizing forms of political action that minorities might otherwise feel
compelled to pursue. Those more destabilizing forms of political action would likely seek, inter alia, to marginalize the Supreme Court's
involvement in the formulation of future race-relations policy for the
United States. Although such marginalization could ultimately prove
beneficial to racial minorities, it would almost certainly impair the
ability of the Supreme Court to serve as an effective check on minority demands for a more equitable allocation of societal resources-a
checking function that the Supreme Court has become very adept at

93. A conservative voting bloc on the Supreme Court virtually never votes for affirmative
action. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 159-61 (discussing Supreme
Court voting blocs).
94. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (2003) (stating that strict
scrutiny is not necessarily fatal scrutiny).
95. See supra THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION note 41 (discussing voting record of Justice O'Connor in affirmative action cases).
96. I have argued in the past that racial minorities are likely to be more successful in advancing minority interests by pursuing political rather than judicial remedies for persistent racial
inequality. See RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 26, at 85-171 (advocating "pure politics"
rather than judicial protection of minority rights).
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performing. Ironically, the Court has done so in the name of promoting racial equality.9 7
II.

INVIDIOUS EQUALITY

The distaste for affirmative action underlying the sunset language
of Grutter is noteworthy for what it seems to say about the peculiar
understanding of equality adopted by the Supreme Court. The Court
views affirmative action as constitutionally problematic because raceconscious efforts to redistribute societal resources from Whites to racial minorities jeopardize the equal protection rights of the White majority. The Court believes that this is true even though Whites already
enjoy a disproportionately large share of those resources, and even
though racial minorities continue to be disproportionately disadvantaged in virtually every facet of American life. The Court, therefore,
reads the constitutional concept of equality as something that entitles
Whites to retain the surfeit of resources that they presently possess,
notwithstanding the discriminatory manner in which those resources
were obtained.
By cementing the existing distribution of resources into the Constitution, the Supreme Court has inverted the customary understanding of discrimination so that disadvantaged racial minorities have now
become the perpetrators of invidious discrimination, and the White
beneficiaries of prior discrimination have become the innocent victims. Moreover, this inverted conception of equality invites the continued oppression of racial minorities, so long as that oppression is
implemented through the momentum of prospective race neutrality.
Every era in the Nation's history has been marked by its own form of
racial discrimination, and antipathy toward affirmative action simply
constitutes the preferred form of discrimination in contemporary
United States culture. Like the forms of discrimination preceding it,
opposition to affirmative action continues the sacrifice of racial minority interests for the benefit of the White majority. Unlike the culture's
better known acts of racial oppression, however, this present form of
discrimination is being justified in the name of racial equality itself.
That is a curious conception of equality. But it is an appealing conception, if one is still wedded to a belief in white supremacy.
97. I have also argued in the past that one function of the Supreme Court has historically
been to facilitate the oppression of racial minority interests for the benefit of the White majority.
See id. at 1-82 (describing "veiled majoritarian" function of Supreme Court in sacrificing minority rights for majoritarian gain).
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A.

Constitutionalizing the Status Quo

It is no secret that Whites do better than racial minorities in the
accumulation of societal resources. Whites acquired their resources
during centuries of de jure and de facto discrimination, in which racial
minorities were placed at a competitive disadvantage in seeking a proportionate share of society's economic, political, and social capital.
What is less well known, however, is that the Supreme Court continues to interpret the Constitution in ways that seem designed to preserve existing inequalities despite the history of discrimination that
produced them. By adopting the current allocation of resources as a
baseline in conducting its equal protection analyses, the Court avoids
the need to provide any remedy for the continuing effects of prior
"societal discrimination." Furthermore, by reading the Constitution
to require prospective neutrality in the vast majority of future allocation programs, the Court precludes political actors from adopting
strategies that might eventually equalize the allocation of resources.
In short, the Supreme Court has constitutionalized existing racial inequalities, and it has done so in the name of promoting equality.
1. Societal Discrimination
For much of the Nation's history, the White majority channeled
resources to itself by adopting explicit policies of de jure racial discrimination, and the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
those discriminatory policies.9 8 When the Court later decided that
that de jure discrimination was no longer constitutional, 99 the White
majority shifted to de facto discrimination as the means for channeling
resources to itself, and the Supreme Court once again upheld the constitutionality of those discriminatory policies. 1" One might think that
the equal protection clause would invalidate allocation policies that
98. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that
Blacks could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of
establishing diversity jurisdiction, and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread
of slavery, as interfering with property rights of slave owners); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public
facilities).
99. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (rejecting separatebut-equal doctrine, and declaring official school segregation to be unconstitutional); but cf.
Brown 1 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (tempering effect of Brown I by declining to order immediate
school desegregation, and instead requiring desegregation "with all deliberate speed").
100. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow
inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segregation, thereby permitting suburban
schools to remain predominantly White and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly
minority).
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had a racially discriminatory effect, as Title VII does in the context of
employment discrimination."' But the Court chose instead to read
the Constitution as requiring particularized showings of discriminatory intent to trigger the application of equal protection safeguards." 2
Although de facto discrimination policies are often motivated, at least
in part by a desire to give Whites an advantage over racial minorities
in the allocation of resources, 0 3 the Supreme Court has adopted such
a stringent standard of proof for intentional discrimination that the
Court's standard is typically not satisfied even by practices that10are
4
commonly understood to be the product of racial discrimination.
The primary doctrinal technique that the Court uses to insulate
customary patterns of racial discrimination from equal protection
safeguards is to label such patterns "societal discrimination," and to
announce that they are, therefore, beyond the remedial reach of the
equal protection clause.10 5 As previously noted,1 06 this can make the
Supreme Court's conception of equality seem quite artificial. For example, Richmond, Virginia was not only the capital of the Confederacy during the Civil War, but the continuing effects of historical
discrimination in Richmond remained so pervasive in 1989 that only
0.67 percent of all municipal construction contracts had been awarded
to minority contractors, even though the population of Richmond was
101. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (adopting disparate impact
standard for employment discrimination under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
102. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (adopting intentional discrimination standard for discrimination under equal protection clause).
103. See, e.g., Milliken, supra note 100 (discussing use of de facto discrimination to keep
minorities out of suburban schools).
104. See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-48 (permitting use of non-validated verbal exam, with
known racially disparate impact, to select police officers); see also Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (holding that mere awareness of known discriminatory
effects was not sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement of equal protection clause).
105. This prohibition on the use of legal remedies to redress general societal discrimination,
as opposed to identifiable acts of particularized discrimination, was articulated by Justice Lewis
Powell in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978), and
reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274-79
(1986) (Powell, J., plurality). Led by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, this view has now been
adopted by a majority of the full Supreme Court. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-25
(2003) (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying societal discrimination); Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (rejecting societal discrimination); see also Metro Broad. Inc., v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610-14 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (same); Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); see generally THE LAW OF
AFFIRMATIVE AcTION, supra note 26, at 168-69 (discussing general societal discrimination);
Spann, supra note 91, at 109-12 (2005) (same); The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 34, at 22931 (2004) (same).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
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50% Black. Nevertheless, the Court found that even in context, this
stark statistical showing was insufficient to establish the intentional
discrimination necessary to permit the use of race-conscious affirmative action remedies for prior discrimination. °7 Rather, the statistics
supported only a showing of general "'societal discrimination,"' entailing merely "the history of discrimination in society at large," which
"without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy."10 8 The Court distinguished this general societal discrimination from "the 'focused' goal of remedying 'wrongs worked by
specific instances of racial discrimination,"' which is necessary to establish the particularized acts of past discrimination required to trigger an affirmative action remedy. 0 9
Most contemporary discrimination is, of course, "societal" in nature. Although some identifiable individuals undoubtedly still deny
resources such as jobs, housing, or educational opportunities to individual applicants because of the applicant's race, those particularized
acts of racial discrimination are not what account for the bulk of the
statistical disadvantages that racial minorities presently suffer in the
allocation of resources. Modern discrimination is more subtle. It
grows out of the often unconscious racial prejudices and stereotypes
that influence the application of supposedly neutral allocation standards, such as merit measured by standardized test scores, or seniority
resting on generations of cultural expectations about appropriate job
categories for racial minorities. ° Most contemporary discrimination
is, therefore, "societal discrimination"-the precise form of discrimination that the Supreme Court refuses to treat as constitutionally
cognizable.
The Supreme Court's refusal even to recognize the most pervasive societal causes of minority disadvantage as a form of discrimination provides a tremendous advantage to Whites. Whites now get to
keep all of the resources that they acquired through centuries of past
discrimination without ever having to account for those centuries of
107. See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-508 (1989) (discussing inability of statistics to
establish past discrimination).
108. See id. at 496-97 (O'Connor, J., plurality) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality).
109. See id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)).
110. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1508-10 (2005) (discussing unconscious racial bias revealed by Implicit Association Test); Charles R. Lawrence II,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317, 322-23 (1987) (arguing that much contemporary racial discrimination is unconscious).
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racial exploitation. Whites are given a vested constitutional right to
retain the resources that they acquired by abridging the rights of racial
minorities. Stated in doctrinal terms, the Supreme Court now adopts
the current allocation of resources as the appropriate constitutional
baseline in conducting its equal protection analyses.
A baseline is something that separates the factors that a court
actively considers from the factors whose validity a court assumes
without examination."u For the Supreme Court, therefore, the prior
discrimination that produced present racial inequalities is deemed
constitutionally irrelevant because it lies beneath the Court's analytical baseline. In ascertaining what the equal protection clause requires, centuries of racial discrimination-as well as the continuing
effects that such discrimination produced-are simply ignored. To use
a footrace metaphor, Whites cheated by shackling minorities long
enough to give themselves an enormous head start in the race for resources. Under the analytical baseline adopted by the Supreme
Court, however, the Constitution does not require Whites ever to slow
down long enough for those minorities to catch up.
The Court's notion that societal discrimination does not "count"
as discrimination for equal protection purposes is a bit bizarre. One
would think that the whole point of the Equal Protection Clause was
to eliminate societal discrimination because that is precisely the type
of discrimination that would ensure that racial minorities continued to
occupy the lowest, most disadvantaged rungs on the socioeconomic
ladder. It seems that only an affirmative desire to protect Whites by
hindering minority advancement could account for a jurisprudence
that viewed societal discrimination as non-cognizable. Unfortunately,
however, the Supreme Court's historical involvement in the culture's
previous forms of racial oppression, coupled with its current insistence
on prospective race neutrality, make the attribution of such a motive
to the Supreme Court uncomfortably plausible.
2.

Prospective Neutrality

A corollary to the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize past discrimination as constitutionally relevant is the Court's penchant for
prospective race neutrality. Because the Court appears to believe that
there is no longer any prior discrimination to remedy, the Court also
111. See Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalization,49 ST. Louis UNIV. L. R~v. 709, 722-29
(2005) (describing baseline shifting as a strategic analytical technique).
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believes that prospective colorblindness is the best way to ensure compliance with the equal protection clause. That preoccupation with
prospective neutrality is striking because the Supreme Court was noticeably oblivious to minority demands for race neutrality in the past.
It seems as if neutrality is important to the Court only when it advances the interests of Whites. Moreover, an insistence on prospective neutrality now permits the Court to prolong the resourceallocation advantages that Whites have over racial minorities, while
simultaneously claiming to be safeguarding the constitutional concept
of equality.
Historically, the Supreme Court's concern with race neutrality
was most notable for its absence. In addition to upholding the institution of slavery in Dred Scott,112 the Court largely ignored the idea of
racial equality for the first 165 years after the Constitution was
adopted, thereby allowing Whites systematically to engage in de jure
discrimination against racial minorities.1 13 For example, the Court invalidated congressional efforts to outlaw racial discrimination in public accommodations in the Civil Rights Cases;1 14 it upheld the separate
but equal regime of Plessy v. Ferguson; 15 and it permitted the intern11 6
ment of Japanese-American citizens in Korematsu v. United States.
Even after the Court finally declared de jure discrimination to be unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education,1 1 7 the Court declined
to invalidate a Virginia miscegenation statute in Naim v. Naim.'1 8 All
of those cases have now become infamous for their disregard of racial
minority interests when minorities were being oppressed by the White
majority through the explicit use of invidious racial classifications.
112. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407, 452 (1857) (holding that Blacks could not be
citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery, as interfering with property rights of slave owners).
113. There were isolated occasions on which the Supreme court invalidated racial discrimination even during this early period. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303,
305-12 (1880) (invalidating state refusal to permit Blacks to serve on juries).
114. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and imposing state-action requirement on the Fourteenth
Amendment that made southern states, rather than the federal government, primary guarantors
of civil rights).
115. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal
regime of racial discrimination in public facilities).
116. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1944) (upholding World War II
exclusion order that led to the internment of Japanese American citizens).
117. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493-95 (rejecting separate-but-equal doctrine, and declaring
official school segregation to be unconstitutional).
118. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing Naim v. Naim litigation).
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Although the Court largely ignored the equal protection clause
when Whites discriminated against racial minorities, things were different once racial minorities began to pursue equal rights through the
adoption of racial affirmative action. At that point, the Supreme
Court infused new life into the equal protection clause, choosing to
apply strict equal protection scrutiny to racial affirmative action, even
though it had failed to apply strict scrutiny to earlier de jure discrimination.' 1 9 In addition, the Court refused to draw any distinction between invidious discrimination and benign affirmative action in
selecting the appropriate standard of review. 2 Curiously, the Court
did this despite its 1954 decision in Brown.'
Brown had initially
served as a beacon of hope for minorities seeking to obtain racial justice after a history of oppression and official segregation. Brown precluded the use of racial classifications that disadvantaged racial
minorities through continued racial segregation, t 22 but subsequent
cases implementing Brown expressly permitted the use of racial classifications to achieve desegregation.1 23 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court's affirmative action decisions proceeded to turn Brown on its
head. The Court began to use the race-neutrality component of Brown
not as a means of protecting racial minorities, but as the basis for protecting Whites. The Court did so by strictly scrutinizing race-conscious affirmative action on the ground that it deviated from the
24
constitutional norm of race neutrality.1
Reading the Equal Protection Clause to favor prospective race
neutrality over race-conscious efforts to remedy prior discrimination,
the contemporary Court ended up invalidating most of the racial affirmative action cases that it considered.1 2 5 The Court held that the
strict scrutiny standard could be satisfied only by showing the pres119. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-27, 235 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to benign affirmative action); cf. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-18 (applying strict scrutiny
to invidious discrimination during World War II, but upholding discrimination).
120. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27, 235 (applying strict scrutiny to benign affirmative action and overruling use of intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting).
121. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (rejecting separate-but-equal doctrine, and
declaring official school segregation unconstitutional).
122. See id. (holding that separate is inherently unequal in the context of public education).
123. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971) (effectively requiring race-conscious pupil assignment to remedy prior school segregation); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1971) (authorizing race-conscious pupil
assignment as remedy for prior maintenance of unconstitutional dual school system).
124. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27, 235 (applying strict scrutiny to benign affirmative
action).
125.

See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 156-59, 162-63 (discussing

results in Supreme Court affirmative action cases).
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ence of both a compelling governmental interest and a narrowly-tailored connection between that interest and the means chosen by the
government to advance it.126 Although one could easily imagine that
remedial affirmative action would satisfy even the stringent standards
of strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court chose to apply strict scrutiny in a
way that left little chance for affirmative action to survive constitutional challenge. True, the Court in Adarand had stated that strict
scrutiny was not necessarily fatal scrutiny. 127 But prior to the Court's
5-4 decision in Grutter, no affirmative action program had ever withstood strict scrutiny.1 2 8 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor cast the fifth
vote to uphold the affirmative action plan at issue in Grutter,129 but
Justice O'Connor is no longer on the Court. 130 As a result, it is unclear whether the constitutionality of any affirmative action will ever
be upheld again in the post-Grutterera. 3 ' Ironically, this may be true
despite Justice O'Connor's twenty-five year language in Grutter. My
colleague Emma Jordan refers to the possibility that a newly constituted Supreme Court will simply override Grutter's arguable twentyfive year grace period for affirmative action as the Supreme Court's
"new math.' 1

32

Prospective neutrality might make sense as a method of promoting racial equality when Whites and minorities are similarly situated
with respect to the allocation of resources. However, it is a perverse
way of pursing equality when Whites and minorities begin with vast
discrepancies in the resources that they have been allocated. Prospec126. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (requiring narrow tailoring to advance compelling state
interest).
127. See id. at 237 (seeking to dispel notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in
fact").
128. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 166-68, 176, 185 (discussing,
prior to Grutter, failure of any case to survive strict scrutiny since Korematsu).
129. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003) (listing Justices who voted to uphold
Grutter affirmative action program).
130. See Biskupic, supra note 44 (discussing new Supreme Court Justices).
131. The Supreme Court has now granted certiorariin two school cases that concern the use
of race to break ties in pupil assignments as a way of promoting racial integration. Those cases,
which can arguably be characterized as affirmative action cases, are set to be argued during the
Court's October 2006 Term. The decisions in those cases may provide more information about
the current Court's views on affirmative action. See Parents Involved in Cmt'y Schools v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (2006);
McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. School, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam), cert. granted sub nor. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2531
(2006); cf. Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1 (2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
798 (2005) (denying certiorari in similar program upheld by lower court).
132. Emma Coleman Jordan is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.
Professor Jordan received a Bachelor of Arts from San Francisco State University and Doctor of
Jurisprudence from Howard University School of Law.
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tive neutrality not only fails to correct for past discrimination, but it
insists on prolonging existing inequalities. It invalidates race-conscious efforts at redistribution on the ground that such redistribution
would somehow be unconstitutionally unfair. But the unfairness is
unfairness to Whites not to racial minorities.
The concept of equality advanced by the Supreme Court's disregard of past societal discrimination and its focus on prospective neutrality is itself invidious. It has the obvious effect of perpetuating the
advantages that Whites have over racial minorities into the indefinite
future. This invidious equality not only permits, but also compels, the
continued sacrifice of minority interests for the benefit of the White
majority. It enables Whites to continue benefiting from the societal
discrimination that channels resources toward them and away from
racial minorities, and it enables them to feel good about themselves as
they do so. After all, the White majority is only doing what the Supreme Court has declared that the Equal Protection Clause requires.
In addition to having a discriminatory effect, it is difficult to view
the Court's commitment to prospective neutrality as anything other
than camouflage for an intent to discriminate against racial minorities.
It seems that whenever the neutrality principle is invoked, it is invoked in a context that is racially oppressive. The principle was invoked to defend the separate-but-equal regime of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 33 where the Supreme Court accepted the argument that
there was nothing unequal about racial segregation. If Blacks felt that
segregation tainted them as inferior to Whites, the Court stated that
this was simply an outgrowth of Black insecurity-not the result of
any discriminatory treatment that Blacks received at the hands of the
Similarly, defenders of the Virginia miscegenation
White majority.'
statute that survived Brown in Naim v. Naim 35 argued that the statute
promoted race neutrality. They stressed that the statute's prohibition
on racial intermarriage necessarily had the same effect on both races
implicated in a putative mixed marriage, thereby eliminating any pos-

133. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
134. See id. at 551-52 (asserting that feelings of inferiority emanate from segregation "solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it").
135. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam); 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam). The
Virginia miscegenation statute was ultimately invalidated by the Supreme Court in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing history
of Naim and Loving).
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sibility of discrimination against racial minorities. 1 36 More recently,

California's famous Proposition 209 ballot initiative has now amended
the State Constitution to prohibit affirmative action by state agencies
in matters ranging from school admissions to the award of government contracts.1 37 Proposition 209 was formally titled the "California
Civil Rights Initiative," in order to assert that the adverse effects of

the initiative were being inflicted on racial minorities in the name of
prospective neutrality.1 3 8 But Proposition 209 instead illustrates quite
clearly how the139concept of equality can be used to prolong invidious
discrimination.

It seems more than mere coincidence that the proponents of prospective neutrality in those prior contexts were political conservatives
striving to limit the rights of racial minorities rather than to advance

those rights. The current Supreme Court's preference for prospective
neutrality over affirmative action emanates from a Court that is also
politically conservative and seems intent on sharing in the invidious
pedigree that prospective neutrality had acquired from the earlier

contexts in which it was advanced.140 There are now a number of
cases in which the Court has invoked the concept of race neutrality1 as
41
the justification for denying societal resources to racial minorities.
136. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8 (arguing that the statute had equal effect on Whites and
racial minorities). One problem with this interpretation was that the statute by its terms applied
only to intermarriage involving White people. The Supreme Court, however, stated that the
statute would be unconstitutional even if it applied equally to all races. See id. at 11-12 (invalidating even the statute that applied to all races).
137. See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 201-07 (1997) (describing
Proposition 209).
138. See id. at 226-28 (discussing decision to name Proposition 209 the "California Civil
Rights Initiative").
139. See id. at 292-322 (arguing that the so-called neutrality of Proposition 209 actually discriminates against women and racial minorities).
140. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE AcTiON, supra note 26, at 159-63 (discussing Supreme

Court voting blocs).
141. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating University of Michigan
undergraduate student affirmative action plan); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957 (1996) (plurality
opinion) (invalidating majority-minority voting districts adopted by. state legislature); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901-02 (1996) (same); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921 (1995) (same); see
also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 238-39 (1995) (apparently invalidating
congressionally-adopted minority construction preference under strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (invalidating minority construction set-aside
adopted by city council); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (invalidating layoff preference for minority teachers adopted by board of education as
part of consent decree); see generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities); cf. Lawyer v.
Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 580-83 (1997) (upholding, under rational-basis scrutiny, constitutionality of voter redistricting plan that used race as factor, where race did not predominate over
traditional districting principles and plan was part of consent decree that omitted disputed ma-
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Those cases invalidated affirmative action programs that sought the
redistribution of resources ranging from educational admissions, to
voting rights, to government contracts. 1 42 The Supreme Court is not
only turning the concept of equality into a device that promotes invidious discrimination, but it is inverting the very concept of discrimination itself.
B.

Inverse Discrimination

One recurrent tradition in United States race relations has been
the effort to recast unattractive cultural practices in terms that are
self-congratulatory rather than morally offensive. This tradition has
permitted the culture to retain a positive image of itself, while continuing to engage in activities that would be normatively unacceptable if
viewed from a more critical perspective. Accordingly, the moral repulsiveness of slavery was deflected by depicting it as a social institution that actually benefited Blacks through the provision of
sustenance, civilization, and the discipline needed to tame the inherently savage nature of Black African slaves.14 3 Likewise, the theft of
Indian lands, the decimation of Indian populations, and the relocation
of survivors to reservations, was justified by the need for westward
expansion and the desire to bring humanizing Christianity to the Indian tribes.'
Post-Reconstruction segregation simply reflected the
accepted status of the races in a way that was required to preserve
racial harmony and the natural social order. 145 Furthermore, the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II was jusjority-minority district); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 77-79 (1997) (upholding court-adopted
districting plan that substituted one majority-minority district for three majority-minority districts contained in plan adopted by state legislature after Supreme Court invalidation and remand in Miller).
142. Id.
143. See GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH, OR, THE FAILURE OF FREE SOCIETY 84 (A. Morris 1854) (slavery was a civilizing institution that prevented slaves from becoming "idolatrous, savage and cannibal" in nature); ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L.
ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY

217 (1974)

(discussing claim that slavery elevated Blacks from natural savage state); LEON F.

LITWACK,

BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 188-89 (1979) (same); see also

Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparationsfor Slavery, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AMER. L. 497, 521-22 (2003) (discussing argument advanced in DAVID HOROWITZ,
UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY (2002) that Blacks were

made better off by institution of slavery).
144. See William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-50 (2005) (discussing Indian genocide, land theft, and forced relocation, combined with ethnocide by Christian missionaries).
145. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-45 (1896) (asserting that segregation reflected
natural social order).
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tified by the need for deference to the expert judgment of military
officials seeking to protect the national security in a time of global
war.146 The invidious nature of the manner in which racial minorities
are mistreated by Whites is never conceded at the time it is occurring.
Rather, invidiousness is only discovered in retrospect by some later
generation, after a new theory of admirable conduct has been adopted
to justify that generation's treatment of racial minorities.
True to form, we are told that the culture's present reluctance to
redistribute resources in a racially equitable manner is to be understood not as an act of ongoing discrimination, but rather as adherence
to a praiseworthy cultural value. Far from being invidious, the Supreme Court has taught us that resistance to affirmative action is
rooted in the need to prevent a new form of racial discrimination-the
reverse discrimination that occurs when racial minorities abuse their
subordinate social status to take advantage of innocent Whites. 47
However, it is only by entering a conceptual universe in which the
customary attributes of discrimination have been thoroughly inverted
that such a claim could have even facial plausibility. And any facial
plausibility that might be present could exist only if one continued to
acquiesce in the culture's long-standing tradition of White supremacy.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's characterization of affirmative action as just another form of racial discrimination appears to be taking
hold in contemporary culture.
1.

Through the Looking-Glass

I had always thought that the problem of racial discrimination in
the United States derived from the White majority's propensity to
treat its own interests as more important than the interests of racial
minorities, thereby enabling Whites to advance their own economic,
political, and social welfare at minority expense. 48 That is the problem which first produced a lack of racial parity in the allocation of
societal resources, and that is the problem which has perpetuated the
146. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1944) (deferring to military judgment concerning national security need to exclude Japanese-Americans from their homes on the
West Coast).
147. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (suggesting
that racial minorities may sacrifice the interests of Whites for their own benefit once they gain
political control).
148. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that
White majority might choose to impose burdens on politically underrepresented discrete and
insular minorities); see generally JOHN HART ELY, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review 135-79 (1980) (elaborating representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review).
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racially disproportionate maldistribution of those resources for hundreds of years. 49 However, the hostility to affirmative action reflected in Justice O'Connor's Grutter sunset language appears to rest
on the belief that contemporary racial discrimination entails the exploitation of White majority rights by selfish racial minorities. Inverting the customary understanding of discrimination in such a
striking manner, it seems to emanate from some legal domain existing
on the other side of the Looking-Glass, where a mirror-image Constitution serves to protect the perpetrators from the victims. In fact,
some Supreme Court discussions of affirmative action seem as arbitrary and ungrounded as the wordplay that characterizes Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass."'°
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful
tone, 1"it
means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor
51
less."'

It often seems as if Humpty Dumpty is now writing affirmative action
opinions for the Supreme Court.
According to what is probably the prevailing contemporary theory of judicial review, racial discrimination is bad because the White
majority has demonstrated an enduring capacity to disadvantage racial minorities who suffer representation-reinforcement difficulties
stemming from their discrete and insular nature.15 2 As described by
Justice Stone's famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene
Products,5 3 racial minorities pose a special problem for democratic
theory. The discrete and insular nature of racial minorities makes
Whites reluctant to deal with them in the normal give and take of
pluralist political bargaining. That pattern, in turn, creates a danger
that representation-reinforcement defects will cause the interests of
racial minorities to be discounted in the supposedly democratic process of formulating social policy.15 4 Professor John Hart Ely elaborated on this representation-reinforcement problem by emphasizing
that inaccurate stereotypes about racial minorities can unknowingly
cause even well-meaning Whites to discount minority interests, simply
149. See supra Part II.A (discussing perpetuation of past discrimination against racial
minorities).
150. LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION (Martin Gardner
ed.) (2000) (annotation versions of Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass).

151. Id. at 213.
152. See ELY, supra note 148, at 135-79 (discussing representation-reinforcement theory).
153. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
154.
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because of mistaken facts or impressions about the ways that minori1 55
ties think or behave.
Representation-reinforcement theory explains why the Supreme
Court might want to invalidate an invidious social policy that discriminated against racial minorities, because the Court could not trust the
integrity of the political process that produced the social policy at issue. However, it does not explain why the Supreme Court would
want to invalidate a benign affirmative action policy that was adopted
by Whites to benefit racial minorities. Because Whites constitute a
majority in the political process, there is little danger that a process
defect taints the resulting policy when the White majority chooses to
disadvantage itself. Inverting the concept of racial discrimination so
that it compelled the invalidation of affirmative action would, therefore, require an account of the political process that reversed the customary understanding of the manner in which discrimination operates.
The Court would either have to believe that racial minorities constituted a local majority capable of dominating the political process; that
minorities could control the political process despite their discrete and
insular minority status; or that even benign discrimination was a deontological evil that could never be tolerated, regardless of its instrumental value. However, none of those alternatives seem tenable.
It is true that concentrated racial minority populations can sometimes constitute local majorities. Demographic patterns, and the high
degree of residential segregation existing in the United States, can
give racial minorities the status of a numerical majority in certain geographic regions. 5 6 However, this local majority status typically does
not give minorities controlling political power. As has been noted,15 7
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. concerned an affirmative action
plan adopted in Richmond, Virginia, where the population was 50%
Black, and where Blacks occupied five of the nine seats on the Richmond City Council. 58 Nevertheless, the minority set-aside plan
adopted by the City Council reserved only 30% of future municipal
construction contracts for racial minorities,'1 59 rather than a racially
155. See ELY, supra note 148, at 135-79 (discussing representation-reinforcement theory).
156. See generally DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing concept of urban residential
"hypersegregation" in United States).
157. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing Croson).
158. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (discussing racial
makeup of Richmond and of Richmond City Council).
159. See id. at 476-86 (describing Richmond set-aside plan).
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proportional 50% or more. This suggests that Whites can retain sufficient residual political power to prevent racial minorities from exercising the full force of political leverage that their local majority status
might be thought to give them. Moreover, even if the Black City
Council majority possessed the political power to demand a racially
proportional share of municipal construction contracts, the Richmond
set-aside plan could still have been invalidated by the Virginia state
legislature, or by the United States Congress. Both of those legislative
bodies have the power to preempt City Council enactments, and both
legislative bodies are controlled by White majorities. Because racial
minorities continue to constitute numerical minorities at the state and
national levels, any majority status that racial minorities might possess
at the local level is always subject to nullification at a higher political
level by the White majority. Indeed, the Richmond set-aside plan was
itself nullified by the United States Supreme Court,16 ° and if one
views the Supreme Court as an essentially political institution, its actions can be understood as yet another check on the power of racial
minorities to operate in a politically autonomous manner as a local
16 1
majority.
The decade of Supreme Court redistricting litigation that followed efforts to create majority-minority voting districts under the
Voting Rights Act after the 1990 Census further illustrates the ability
of the White majority to control the political power of concentrated
racial minorities. 162 The need for a Voting Rights Act arose precisely
because the White majority realized that it could draw voting district
lines in ways that dispersed racial minority populations for electoral
purposes. 163 In fact, this racial gerrymandering proved so successful
that States such as North Carolina-despite significant racial minority
populations-were able to prevent any Black representation in Congress from Reconstruction until the creation of the first majority-minority districts under the Voting Rights Act. 1 64 Notwithstanding the
initial successes of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court nevertheless invalidated virtually all of the majority-minority districts
160. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-508 (invalidating Richmond set-aside plan).
161. I have argued elsewhere that this is, in fact, a "veiled majoritarian" function of the
Supreme Court.

See RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 26, at 1-6 (describing veiled

majoritarian function of Supreme Court).
162.

See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 107-55 (discussing Supreme

Court redistricting cases).
163. See id. at 85-86 (discussing function of Voting Rights Act).
164. See cases cited supra note 52 (discussing lack of Black representatives in Congress).
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whose constitutionality it considered in the decade after the 1990 Census. t 65 Therefore, the superior political power of the White majority at

the state and national levels, fortified by the ability of the Supreme
Court to act as a check of last resort for any minority political power
that slips through the political cracks, is typically sufficient to neutralize any danger that local concentrations of racial minority power will
be used in ways that significantly harm the interests of the White
majority.
One might argue that the Supreme Court is nevertheless justified
in invalidating benign affirmative action programs because racial minorities possess the power to control the political process despite their
numerical minority status. At first blush, this manipulation-throughweakness suggestion seems implausible when offered in the context of
a White majority that has had a long history of successfully subordinating the interests of racial minorities. However, economic theory
lends some credence to the possibility that discrete and insular minority interests can trump the interests of the majority. Public choice theory posits that cohesive minority groups pursuing a shared interest
will have a greater incentive to organize politically than the more diffuse majority, whose ability to engage in political action can effectively be paralyzed by the free-rider problem. 1 66 According to the
theory, individual Whites will assume that someone else in the White
majority will take the political action necessary to preserve the existing advantages that Whites have over racial minorities, but because
every individual White has the same incentive to "free ride" on the
efforts of others, no one ends up taking the necessary political action.
Racial minorities, however, will have a greater incentive to engage in
political action. This is because the higher degree of group cohesiveness produced by a shared experience of oppression gives racial minorities a better understanding of the need for collective action to
overcome the free rider problem.
There are at least two problems with this public choice account.
First, it assumes a degree of minority cohesiveness that seems unrealistically high. Competition among different racial minority groups for
the limited number of resources that the White majority makes availa165. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 107-55, 162, 180-89 (discussing
outcomes in constitutional redistricting cases); cf Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-58
(2003) (upholding a redistricting plan after finding that it used race merely as a proxy for partisan political gerrymandering).
166. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE To IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 10-21 (1997) (describing public choice theory).
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ble to racial minorities can undermine group cohesiveness. 67 Moreover, social and economic class divisions within particular racial
minority groups can generate more friction than political cohesion, as
evidenced by the common criticism that affirmative action really benefits middle class minorities rather than the most disadvantaged racial
minorities.168 Second, public choice theory seems empirically incorrect when applied in the context of racial discrimination. It is true
that racial minorities have benefited from the passage of some civil
rights legislation and from the adoption of some affirmative action
programs. However, those successes are extremely limited when compared to the vast discrepancies that continue to exist in the allocation
of resources between Whites and racial minorities. 169 If racial minorities truly possessed the political power to override the resource allocation preferences of a White majority that was cohesive enough to
secure them, one would expect racial minorities to have achieved
much more parity than they have been able to achieve in the last 400
years. Any enhanced political power that public choice theory gives
to racial minorities is, therefore, insignificant when compared to the
magnitude of the resource allocation problems that minorities continue to confront, and the high degree of White cohesiveness that such
a distribution of resources suggests.
The Supreme Court could, in theory, attempt to justify its hostility to even benign affirmative action on the ground that all racial classifications are simply unacceptable as a deontological matter, because
racial discrimination is morally wrong. Under this view, any instrumental benefits produced by affirmative action in facilitating a more
equitable distribution of resources would arguably be irrelevant. Only
race-neutral means of pursuing those instrumental objectives should
normally be permitted."' 0 Again, there are at least two problems with
this deontological justification.
First, the term "estoppel" cries out for recognition. If racial classifications violate some moral imperative, why has that violation be167. The problem of competition among minority factions is discussed in Part I1I.B.2.
168. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 48-50 (discussing failure of affirmative action to benefit minorities in lower economic classes).
169. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing statistics showing disadvantages suffered by racial minorities).
170. The Court sometimes uses language suggesting a deontological opposition to racial classifications. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493. 507, 509 (1989)
(emphasizing the "personal right" to be free from racial discrimination and favoring "race neutral" efforts to remedy prior discrimination).
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come apparent only now, when racial classifications are being offered
to aid racial minorities? Why did the Court not invoke that same
moral imperative when racial classifications were being used to aid
Whites in their exploitation of racial minority interests? 17 ' Any deontological evil that might be inherent in racial classifications would
have to be of fairly recent vintage.
Second, even if one believes that the Supreme Court should adhere to a principle of race neutrality at the present time-irrespective
of whether it possessed the moral courage to do so in the past-the
moral principle being advanced is unacceptably truncated. Such a
principle would pursue the goal of prospective neutrality in a way that
completely ignored the need for corrective justice. Because such a
principle would simply freeze existing distributional inequalities in the
manner described in Part II.A.2 above,'1 72 it would lack any normative
appeal. Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of a principle that
totally disregarded the need for corrective justice as a moral principle
at all.
The Supreme Court's theory that racial affirmative action is
somehow discriminatory, and that the perpetuation of White privilege
in the allocation of resources is somehow nondiscriminatory, makes
sense only on the other side of the Looking-Glass. It makes sense
only in a place where the customary understanding of discrimination
and discrimination remedies has been reversed. However, it seems
that we have now passed through the Looking-Glass and have fallen
victim to the laws of inverse discrimination that govern on the other
side. That is the only satisfactory explanation for our willingness to
accord the Supreme Court's anti-affirmative action jurisprudence
even a grain of plausibility. Nevertheless, the tolerance that we show
for Supreme Court racial policies, combined with the adoption of antiredistribution measures such as California's Proposition 209,173 suggests that we now believe affirmative action to pose more of a threat
to racial equality than the threat posed by perpetuating discrimination
itself. That belief seems quite perplexing-at least until one realizes
that it rests on a persistent notion of White supremacy that has influenced the United States culture from the beginning.
171. The problems entailed in attempting only a prospective application of colorblind race
neutrality were discussed supra Part II.A.2.
172. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing problems with prospective neutrality).
173. See Proposition 209, supra note 137 (discussing Proposition 209).
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2.

White Supremacy

United States culture has always viewed racial minorities as inferior to Whites. The sense of White supremacy that initially served as a
justification for slavery,17 4 eventually found recognition in the United
States Constitution itself.' 75 Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 enhanced
the political power of slave states by increasing the representation of
those states in Congress, so that it was based upon the state's White
population, plus three-fifths of the state's slave population.' 7 6 Article
I, Section 9, Clause 1 prohibited Congress from banning slavery
before 1808.177 Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3 required even free
states to deliver any slave, who managed to escape, back to the slave's
owner. 17 8 And Dred Scott read Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 as not
including Black slaves among those who could be "citizens" within the
meaning of the United States Constitution, thereby denying federal
court diversity jurisdiction to Blacks seeking judicial protection of
their asserted rights.1 79 When the present Supreme Court uses that
same Constitution to question or invalidate contemporary affirmative
action programs, the Court's decisions are rooted in that same notion
of White supremacy.
The Supreme Court's active participation in the Nation's history
of White supremacy can hardly be doubted. The language that the
Dred Scott Court used in justifying its decision to deny citizenship to
Blacks, has become legendary for its racial condescension. Chief Justice Taney stated:
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the
times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence,
show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as
slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not,
were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be
included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in
relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized
174. See sources cited supra note 143 (discussing justifications for slavery).
175. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 448-50 (discussing provisions of Constitution that
protected slavery).
176. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths clause).
177. See id. § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting ban on slavery until 1808).
178. See id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (rendition clause).
179. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407, 452 (1857) (holding that Blacks could not be
citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction & invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery as interfering with property rights of slave owners).
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and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration
of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States
was framed and adopted. But the public history of every European
nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the
white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect;
and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery
for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary
article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made
by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in
morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or
supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private
without doubting
pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern,
1 80
for a moment the correctness of this opinion.
Some Supreme Court Justices maintained similar views about
White supremacy even when they voted to protect the interests of racial minorities. Justice Harlan's famous dissent from the Court's decision to uphold the separate-but-equal regime of Plessy v. Ferguson
asserted that "[o]ur constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens."' 8 1 A few sentences earlier, however,
Justice Harlan's opinion also included the following language:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in
wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all
time, if it remains true to its great1 82heritage, and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty.
As Dred Scott and Plessy illustrate, the sense of White supremacy that
prevailed in the nineteenth century was so pronounced that Supreme
Court Justices felt no compunction about endorsing it openly.
The Supreme Court's sympathy for White supremacy became less
visible in the twentieth century. Indeed, the Court sometimes rejected
assertions of White racial privilege that emanated from other
branches of the political culture. Brown explicitly rejected the White
supremacist foundation of segregation in its 1954 denunciation of the
180. Id. at 407.
181. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
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Plessy separate-but-equal doctrine, stating that "separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."' 8 3 In 1967, when the Supreme
Court finally chose to invalidate Virginia's miscegenation statute in
Loving v. Virginia,1 84 the Court emphasized that the statute's goal of
maintaining racial integrity could be understood only as an unconstitutional measure that was "designed to maintain White
Supremacy."18' 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court refused in 1958 to tolerate the White supremacist efforts by Arkansas Governor Orval
Faubus to block desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock,
announcing in Cooper v. Aaron that the Supreme Court-not a segregationist Southern Governor-had the final say in interpreting the
meaning of the Constitution.1 8 6
If the contemporary Supreme Court is to be the final expositor of
constitutional rights, one would hope that the Court has finally extricated itself from the pull of White supremacy. Even those who disagree with the conservative racial politics of the current Supreme Court
majority tend to think of the Court as more enlightened than its nineteenth century predecessors. But on closer examination, the current
Court appears merely to have repositioned its acquiescence in White
racial privilege, so that the Court's more subtle tolerance of White
supremacy now lies beneath the surface of its opinions.
As noted above, 187 the present Supreme Court has made its aversion to racial parity in the allocation of resources quite clear, viewing
the enterprise of racial balancing as "patently unconstitutional."18' 8 In
Part I.B.3 above, I characterized the Court's objection to this seemingly sensible use of affirmative action as something that is at least
curious." 89 But the Court's objection to racial parity may be more
than merely curious. It may be an extension of the affinity for White
183. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
184. 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (invalidating Virginia miscegenation statute).
185. Id. at 11. The Supreme Court had previously declined to invalidate the Virginia miscegenation statute in Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam); 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per
curiam); see supra note 118 (discussing history of Naim v. Naim and Loving).
186. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958) (declaring that "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution," and that a Governor lacked the power
to nullify a federal court order); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 484-85 (discussing
Cooper v. Aaron and Little Rock school desegregation).
187. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing unconstitutionality of racial
balancing).
188. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 330 (2003) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality)).
189. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (suggesting that affirmative action might be
more cosmetic than real).
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supremacy that was expressed by the nineteenth century Court. More
disturbing than the holdings in the Court's decisions is the tacit sense
of White racial privilege that seems to underlie the Court's aversion to
affirmative action. It is as if the Court objects to affirmative action
not because it deviates from some abstract principle of race neutrality,
but because the Court objects to the idea of racial equality itself.
When the actions of the current and historical Supreme Courts
are compared, the twenty-first century Court seems best understood
as serving a racially oppressive social function that is analogous to the
oppressive social function served by the nineteenth century Court.
Both Courts chose to target and invalidate the most serious prevailing
threats to White supremacy; both chose to seize the power to do so
from the political branches of government; and both chose to camouflage their support for White supremacy by generating counterintuitive legal doctrines. In fact, the similarities between the current and
historical Courts are so strong, that it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the current Court has no greater capacity for promoting racial justice than its predecessor had.
Both the historic and contemporary Supreme Courts sought to
identify, and then neutralize, the greatest prevailing threats existing to
the maintenance of White supremacy in the allocation of resources.
In the nineteenth century, Black chattel slavery permitted Whites to
benefit enormously from the exploitation of racial minority labor, but
one of the greatest threats to the continuation of slavery was posed by
the nineteenth century abolitionist movement. 190 When a political coalition that included abolitionists managed to limit the spread of slavery through enactment of the Missouri Compromise Act of 1854, the
Supreme Court invalidated the statute in Dred Scott."' It also erected
a virtually insurmountable prospective impediment to abolition by
holding that Blacks could not be citizens under the Constitution,
and
1 92
Black slaves constituted constitutionally protected property.

190. See

STEPHEN

ION IN POLITICS

L.

CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIG-

69-99 (2000) (discussing role of religious-based abolitionist movement in ending

slavery).
191. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452 (1857) (invalidating Missouri Compromise
Act).
192. See id. at 407, 451-52 (holding that Blacks could not be citizens within the meaning of
the United States Constitution for purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction and invalidating
congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery, as interfering with property rights of
slave owners).
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The current Supreme Court has performed an analogous function
in perpetuating the existence of contemporary White privilege. Presently, the greatest threat to White racial privilege is posed by racial
affirmative action that seeks to redistribute and promote allocative
parity in resources that are currently channeled to Whites. The modern Supreme Court has protected the existing racial distribution of
resources in cases such as Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pefia,'93 which
held that racial affirmative action is subject to nearly-always-fatal
strict scrutiny despite its benign nature. 94 In addition, cases such as
Grutter have held that the goal of promoting racial balance is "patently unconstitutional." 195 Accordingly, the current Supreme Court
has done for contemporary White supremacy in the existing allocation
of resources what the nineteenth century Court did for the then-existing institution of slavery.
Both past and present Supreme Courts have also seized power
from the representative branches of government in the course of offering judicial protections for White racial privilege. In the nineteenth
century, the political branches of government were more sympathetic
than the Supreme Court to the goal of promoting racial equality. Accordingly, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 after
the Civil War, section five was added expressly to grant Congress the
legislative power to protect Blacks from the foreseeable discrimination that would follow emancipation.1 9 6 One function of section five
was to modify the prevailing understanding of federalism, so that the
federal government, rather than the states, would have the primary
responsibility for protecting the constitutional rights of newly freed
slaves.1 9 7 The nineteenth century Supreme Court, however, simply
disregarded the language of section five. In the Civil Rights Cases,198
the Court not only invalidated the public accommodations provisions
of Congress's Civil Rights Act of 1875, but the Court also adopted a
state action requirement for the Fourteenth Amendment that had the
effect of reinstating the very understanding of federalism that section
193. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
194. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27 (applying strict scrutiny); but cf. id. at 237 (stating that
strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal scrutiny).
195. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 330 (2003) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
196. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 306-08 (1880) (discussing foreseeable discrimination against newly freed slaves).
197. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 457-64 (discussing federalism and function of Fourteenth Amendment).
198. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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five had been designed to reverse.1 99 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court's partial nullification of the Fourteenth Amendment entailed a
judicial usurpation from the political branches of the precise legislative power that the Fourteenth Amendment had been adopted to
create.
Once again, the current Supreme Court has performed an analogous function in usurping race-relations power from the representative branches of government. When the Supreme Court applied strict
scrutiny to the minority set-aside plan in Adarand, the Court effectively invalidated a legislative program that had been adopted by Con20
gress pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather than defer to the judgment of the representative branches, the
Adarand Court instead overruled an earlier Supreme Court decision
in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,2 1 which had expressly recognized that
Congress possessed special affirmative action powers emanating from
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 2 Moreover, the Supreme Court chose to override the political power of the representative branches even though it is difficult to imagine a non-invidious
reason for it to have done so. The task of solving the longstanding
problem of racial discrimination in the United States is obviously a
difficult one, and there is no reason to believe that the politically unaccountable Supreme Court has any institutional advantage over the
politically accountable representative branches in fashioning remedies. It is not as if the Court were reading the text of the Constitution,
or implementing the intent of the Framers. The text gives Congress
the power to address the problem of racial discrimination, and the
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment Framers was to authorize legislative rather than judicial solutions to that problem.20 3 When the contemporary Supreme Court chose to override the remedial power of
the representative branches, it was doing the same thing that the nine199. See id. at 8-19 (invalidating public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, and imposing state-action requirement on the Fourteenth Amendment that made southern
states, rather than the federal government, primary guarantors of civil rights).
200. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing section 5 power).
Prior to Grutter, strict scrutiny had always been fatal for affirmative action. See THE LAW OF
AFFIRMATIVE Ac-TION, supra note 26 at 166-68, 176, 185 (discussing, prior to Grutter, failure of
any case to survive strict scrutiny since Korematsu).
201. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
202. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 235 (overruling Metro Broadcasting and applying strict
scrutiny to affirmative action).
203. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 457-64 (discussing federalism and history of Fourteenth Amendment).
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teenth century Court was doing in Dred Scott. Both Courts were nullifying the efforts of the political branches to ameliorate the problem
of racial discrimination, in order to perpetuate the existing supremacy
of Whites.
A third way in which the current Supreme Court echoes a function performed by its nineteenth century predecessor is that the
Courts in both eras chose to hide their White supremacist inclinations
behind a counterintuitive set of doctrinal rules and legal fictions.
When Dred Scott upheld the institution of slavery in 1857, it did so
primarily on the ground that federal courts lacked diversity jurisdiction over the case.20 4 When the Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 in the Civil Rights Cases, it did so on the technical ground that
the Fourteenth Amendment contained a state action requirement with
which Congress had failed to comply.20 5 And when the Court upheld
the separate-but-equal regime of Plessy, it did so pursuant to a legal
fiction permitting the Court to conclude that racial separation implied
racial equality rather than invidious White supremacy. 20 6 The advantage of basing a judicial decision in esoteric doctrinal terms is that it
camouflages the invidious impact of the Court's decision. Rather than
saying that the Constitution favors the interests of Whites over the
interests of racial minorities, the Court can issue a decision that has
the same White supremacist effect, while talking about doctrinal issues
that appear to be racially neutral. This technique may cause disadvantaged minorities to underrate the degree to which their interests are
being sacrificed for the benefit of the White majority, and it may help
the White majority to believe that it is doing something more principled than simply engaging in racial discrimination. Such judicial
obfuscation has a venerated legal history, dating back to Marbury v.
Madison," 7 where Chief Justice John Marshall succeeded in getting
the institution of judicial review to grow out of a case that doctrinally

204. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-07 (1893) (finding lack of diversity jurisdiction because Blacks could not be citizens).
205. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883) (invalidating public accommodations
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and imposing state-action requirement on the Fourteenth Amendment that made southern states, rather than the federal government, primary
guarantors of civil rights).
206. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (discussing Plessy assertion that separate was equal).
207. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
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concerned the scope of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction under
Article 111.208
The current Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence is
similarly obfuscatory. As has been noted, °9 the Court now seems to
specialize in the legal inversion of equality and discrimination. The
pertinent doctrinal niceties are such that the Court has successfully
been able to characterize the perpetuation of existing inequalities as
racial equality, while characterizing remedial efforts to equalize resource allocations as racial discrimination. 1 0 Moreover, the bulk of
the current Court's doctrinal attention in affirmative action cases has
related not to existing inequalities in the allocation of resources, but
to the appropriate standard of judicial review."' Accordingly, the
Court in Adarand was able to conclude that there was no doctrinally
significant difference between invidious and benign discrimination, as
it imposed a strict scrutiny standard of review for affirmative action. 2
In the same decision, the Court was also able to insist on the legal
fiction that strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal for affirmative action,
even though it virtually always is.213 Although the most significant
form of racial discrimination that exists in the contemporary United
States consists of the entrenched cultural practices that have caused us
to think that the disproportionate allocation of resources to Whites is
somehow natural and neutral, the Supreme Court has established a
doctrinal definition of discrimination under which such general "societal discrimination" simply does not count.21 4 Like the nineteenth century Court, the present Supreme Court has managed to articulate the
doctrines that are relevant to the constitutional concept of racial
equality in a way that makes them too slippery to grasp in a satisfactory way.
208.

See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 37 (citing ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN

SUPREME COURT 40 (1960) for the proposition that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury
was a "masterwork of indirection"). Chief Justice Marshall is often said to have sacrificed a
short term battle over judicial appointments in order to win the long term victory of establishing
judicial review in Marbury. See id.
209. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing inverse discrimination).
210.

See id.

211.

See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 161-68 (discussing standard of

review).
212. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny).
213. See id. at 237 (dispelling notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
But see THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 166-68, 176, 185 (discussing, prior
to Grutter, failure of any case to survive strict scrutiny since Korematsu).
214. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing "societal discrimination").
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The contemporary Supreme Court has read the Constitution to
preclude the goal of racial parity, even though conscious efforts to
achieve racial parity offer the most promising strategy for achieving
racial equality.21 5 The Court's doctrinal decision is difficult to comprehend if the Court is truly interested in promoting racial equality.
In fact, it is so difficult to comprehend, that one is forced to conclude
that the Court must be pursuing some other objective. Unfortunately,
a White supremacist view that racial minority interests are simply not
as important as the interests of Whites offers the only account of the
Supreme Court's doctrinal behavior that seems to ring true. Therefore, the Court can best be viewed as a social institution whose function is to perpetuate the oppression of racial minorities for the benefit
of Whites. The question that then naturally arises is how one who
remains genuinely interested in the pursuit of racial equality can best
respond to such a Supreme Court.
III.

NEUTRALIZING THE COURT

The best way to respond to a Supreme Court that is more concerned with the interests of Whites than with the interests of racial
minorities is to find some way to neutralize the racial impact of the
Court's decisions. To date, the role of the Supreme Court has been
largely to impede the equitable redistribution of resources, by invalidating affirmative action plans that redirect resources to racial minorities. Like the socially regressive role that the Supreme Court played
during the Lochner era,2 16 the role that the current Court plays in
formulating racial policy should be rejected as an inappropriate exercise of judicial favoritism. A better role for the Supreme Court to
play would be that of a mere observer, committed to affirmative inaction in the formulation of racial policy. Racial policy in the United
States should be formulated by the representative branches of government, because the representative branches are politically more accountable than the Court, and are not doctrinally mired in the
Supreme Court's invidious conception of equality. 217 Accordingly,
proponents of racial equality should devote the twenty-five year grace
period, rhetorically granted in Grutter, to the exploration of ways in
which Supreme Court involvement can be held at bay. Limiting the
215. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing racial parity).
216. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at
750-62 (describing rise and fall of Lochner era).
217. See supra Part II (discussing invidious equality).
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prospective influence of the Court on the Nation's racial policy will
not be easy, but success is likely to turn more on reconceived cultural
attitudes about the Court's legitimacy than on the Court's assertions
of raw judicial power. Once minority coalitions are able to reassess
the deference that they themselves accord Supreme Court racial adjudications, they may also be able to lead the culture at large in reassessing the legitimacy of the Court's racial jurisprudence.
A.

Negative Action

Despite Grutter's nominal endorsement of racial diversity in education, the present Supreme Court seems clearly antagonistic to affirmative action in general, and to racial parity in particular. That
antagonism is evident not only from the inclusion of sunset language
in Justice O'Connor's opinion, but also from the holdings of the
Court's other affirmative action decisions. When those decisions are
considered against the backdrop of recent changes in Supreme Court
personnel, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Court's tentative tolerance for affirmative action will prove to be fleeting at best.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court decision in Grutter, the overall
effect of the Court's response to affirmative action can best be characterized as negative action. Moreover, by nullifying the redistributive
efforts of the political branches, the Court has behaved in a manner
that is reminiscent of the now-discredited Lochner regime.218 The
negative action of the Supreme Court's affirmative action regime deserves to be similarly discredited.
1. Limits on Affirmative Action
The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger is generally
viewed as a victory for affirmative action because it upheld the constitutionality of using racial preferences to promote diversity in a law
school educational context. 219 However, Grutter did more to undermine racial affirmative action than to promote it. Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion reaffirmed the application of strict equal protection
scrutiny to even benign affirmative action; 220 it stressed the impermis218. STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 750-62 (describing rise and fall of Lochner era, where
Supreme Court substituted its preferred economic theories for economic theories adopted by
politically accountable legislatures).
219. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323-25, 328-30 (2003) (finding that Michigan law school's effort
to promote diversity in an educational context constituted a compelling governmental interest).
220. See id. at 326-27 (reaffirming strict scrutiny for racial affirmative action).
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sibility of using affirmative action to remedy general "societal discrimination;"2 2 ' and it rejected the legitimacy of using affirmative action to
advance racial parity.2 22 On the same day, the Court also invalidated
a similar affirmative action program in Gratz v. Bollinger,22 3 which
was designed to promote diversity in an undergraduate educational
context. The Court did so even though the program in Gratz seems
analytically indistinguishable from the program in Grutter.22 4 Those
two cases reflect the existence of a Supreme Court affirmative action
regime in which the constitutionality of affirmative action turns
largely upon the racial policy preferences of whatever five Justices
happen to constitute a Supreme Court majority in any give case.
Vesting such racial policymaking discretion in the Supreme Court
is troubling. As one would predict from the Court's historical lack of
sympathy for racial minorities,2 2 5 the contemporary Supreme Court
has exhibited a strong anti-affirmative action bias.22 6 During twelve
years of splintered plurality decisions, the Supreme Court was unable
to agree on a standard of review to govern the constitutionality of
affirmative action.22 7 In 1989, the Court was finally able to issue its
first majority opinion in an affirmative action case, when the Court
applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a minority construction set aside
plan in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 2 28 From 1989 until 2003,
before Grutter and Gratz were decided, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of racial affirmative action in ten cases. The court invali229
dated the affirmative action plans at issue in seven of those cases.
Of the three remaining cases in which the constitutionality of affirma221. See id. at 323-25 (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying societal
discrimination).
222. See id. at 330 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)) (rejecting the goal of racial parity).
223. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-76 (invalidating undergraduate affirmative action program).
224. See The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 34, at 242-49 (arguing that there is no analytical distinction between the Supreme Court decision upholding law school affirmative action program in Grutter and the Supreme Court decision invalidating undergraduate affirmative action
program in Gratz).
225. See supra Part IL.B.2 (discussing historical Supreme Court hostility to racial minority
interests).
226. See generally THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 156-92 (discussing
case outcomes, issues, and voting blocs in Supreme Court affirmative action cases).
227. See id. at 164-68 (discussing standard of review).
228. 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 44-47
(discussing Croson).
229. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 162 (affirmative action voting
chart); see generally id. at 156-61 (discussing outcomes in Supreme Court affirmative action
cases.)
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tive action was upheld, one was subsequently reversed;2 30 one actually
cut back on permissible affirmative action;2 31 and one was disposed of
on procedural grounds.2 32 Collectively, those ten affirmative action
decisions sent a fairly clear message of Supreme Court hostility towards racial affirmative action. 33
The Supreme Court has not only invalidated most of the recent
affirmative action programs that it has considered, but the regulatory
regime that it has established for affirmative action also chills the political branches from adopting new affirmative action programs. The
Court now insists that racial affirmative action must be subject to
strict scrutiny. This is true even though the Court was initially inclined to apply the more permissive standard of intermediate scrutiny
to affirmative action, because of its non-invidious nature.2 3 4 Moreover, the Court curiously applies strict scrutiny to racial affirmative action, while applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based affirmative
action. 2 3 1 This is surprising, because the Fourteenth Amendment was
specifically adopted to authorize special Reconstruction protections
230. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), rev'd Adarand. Constructors Inc. v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 235 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action).
231. See Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 580-83 (1997) (upholding, under rationalbasis scrutiny, constitutionality of voter redistricting plan that used race as factor, where race did
not predominate over traditional districting principles and plan was part of a consent decree that
omitted disputed majority-minority district); cf. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 77-79 (1997)
(upholding court-adopted redistricting plan that substituted one majority-minority district for
three majority-minority districts contained in plan adopted by state legislature after Supreme
Court invalidation and remand in Miller).
232. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 548-54 (1999) (holding that summary judgment
was not appropriate in a redistricting case where racial motivation was a disputed issue of fact).
After remand, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the disputed voting
district, finding that it resulted from a permissible political gerrymander rather than an impermissible racial gerrymander. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2003). Since Grutter
was decided, the Supreme Court invalidated 5-4. under the Voting Rights Act, a mid-decade
Texas redistricting plan that eliminated a majority-Latino voting district. See League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2612-23 (2006) (upholding Latino vote dilution
claim). Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito voted to reject this claim. See id. at 265263 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting in part, with Alito, J.). Justices Scalia and Thomas also voted to
reject this claim. See id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part, with Thomas, J.). In addition, a
majority of the Court rejected a Voting Rights Act claim asserting dilution of black voting
strength). See id. at 2624-26 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J., with Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J.);
id. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, with Alito, J.); id. at 2663-68 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment in part, with Roberts, C.J., Thomas, and Alito, JJ.).
233.

See generally THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACrION, supra note 26, at 189-92 (discussing

Supreme Court hostility to affirmative action.)
234. See id. at 164-68 (discussing use of intermediate scrutiny in early affirmative action
cases).
235. See Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the "anomalous result" produced by subjecting racial affirmative action to strict,
scrutiny while subjecting gender affirmative action to intermediate scrutiny, even though primary purpose of Fourteenth Amendment was to end racial discrimination).
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for racial minorities-protections that were the precursors of contemporary racial affirmative action. 236 Strict scrutiny not only demands
the stringency of a compelling governmental interest and a narrowlytailored means of advancing that interest,2 3 7 but the Court has been
both inconsistent and unclear about what it takes to satisfy those constitutional standards. The relevance of factors such as formal findings,
past discrimination, prospective diversity, and the burden on Whites
has been very unclear. 2 38 As a result, the Supreme Court has been
able to combine doctrinal rigor with doctrinal uncertainty to impose
an in terrorem disincentive on the adoption of affirmative action. Political actors who find it desirable to trade affirmative action for other
concessions from civil rights constituents cannot be certain that their
political deals will be honored by the Supreme Court. In addition,
political actors seeking facial justifications for opposing affirmative action can invoke constitutional uncertainty as a stated basis for their
opposition.
Supreme Court voting in affirmative action cases has always been
politically polarized.2 3 9 Many of the Court's affirmative action decisions were issued with 5-4 votes, where identifiable liberal and conservative voting blocs determined the outcomes. From the time that
Adarand was decided in 1995, until Grutterand Gratz were decided in
2003, a five Justice conservative bloc-consisting of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-virtually always voted against affirmative action. A four Justice liberal
bloc-consisting of Justices Stevens Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyeralways voted in favor of affirmative action.24 ° The customary voting
pattern was broken in Grutter,when Justice O'Connor voted with the
liberal bloc to uphold affirmative action,24 1 and in Gratz, when Justice
Breyer voted with the conservative bloc to invalidate affirmative action.2 42 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor are no longer
on the Court. They have now been replaced by Chief Justice Roberts
236. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 457-64 (discussing purpose of Fourteenth
Amendment).
237. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (requiring narrow tailoring to advance compelling state
interest).
238. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 26, at 161-89 (discussing ambiguities

and inconsistencies in Supreme Court affirmative action standards).
239. See id. at 159-63 (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs).
240. See id. (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs).
241. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311 (2003).
242. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring, with Breyer, J.).
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and Justice Alito respectively.24 3 Although neither new Justice has yet
voted on a Supreme Court affirmative action case,2 44 both Justices are
viewed as conservatives who will likely oppose most affirmative action. 245 The current Court seems more conservative on the issue of
affirmative action than its immediate predecessor because Justice Alito would probably have voted to invalidate even the Grutter affirmative action plan that Justice O'Connor voted to uphold. The Court
has now granted certiorari in two new cases that can arguably be
viewed as affirmative action cases, and the outcomes in those cases
may provide additional evidence of the current Court's tolerance for
246
affirmative action.
Because affirmative action and racial parity offer the best hope
for ever achieving any meaningful degree of racial equality in the
United States, it is difficult to imagine a non-invidious account of why
we tolerate Supreme Court nullification of those strategies. The lack
of political accountability for Supreme Court racial policy formulation
makes such judicial nullification undemocratic. And the racial resentment that understandably ensues is exacerbated by the lack of any
meaningful alternative solution for the problem of White supremacy
that continues to simmer in our increasingly multicultural society.
During the riots of the turbulent 1960s, and on other occasions thereafter, disregarded racial frustrations were sometimes expressed as civil
disobedience. 247 Now, during a time when oppressed groups in other
parts of the world are increasingly turning to acts of terrorism to vent
their anger and feelings of victimization, the danger of unrest in the
United States also seems to be increasing.2 48
Contemporary threats of terrorist activity range from disruptive
computer viruses, to horrific internet postings, to insurgent military
actions, to suicide bombings by those who feel that death is preferable
to continued subjugation. 24 9 The fear and anxiety produced by antici243. See Biskupic, supra note 44 (discussing new Supreme Court Justices).
244. But see cases cited supra note 232 (discussing rejection of minority vote dilution claims
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito).
245. See Biskupic, supra note 44 (discussing political leanings of new Supreme Court Justices). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito did vote to reject Black and Latino vote dilution
claims in a recent Texas redistricting case. See cases cited supra note 232 (discussing Texas redistricting case).
246. See cases cited supra note 131 (discussing pending school cases).
247. See PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 242-316 (1999) (discussing Black frustrations, demonstrations, and riots during civil rights movement of 1960s and thereafter).
248. See generally Terror and Race, supra note 91 (discussing race and the war on terror).

249. See id. at 91-93 (discussing terrorist threats).
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pated acts of future terrorism has now become a seemingly inevitable
facet of contemporary life. Those in power might initially suppose
that increased repression is the best way to guard against the realization of such threats. But the fact that such potent apprehensions have
been created by those who lack conventional power, suggests that
there are inherent limits on the effectiveness of oppression as a means
of economic, political, and social control.
Calm consideration and increased sensitivity to the perspective of
those who feel victimized by longstanding abuses of power may ultimately prove more beneficial than the mere reflexive recourse to yet
additional exercises of oppressive power. For example, a more prudent assessment of the need for military intervention by the United
States in the Middle East, combined with a more serious concern for
the risks imposed on already-victimized noncombatants, may have
avoided some of the unfortunate collateral consequences produced by
the United States military occupation of Iraq.2 5 ° The Iraqi experience
may provide a lesson that is transferable to the realm of affirmative
action. Perhaps, a more prudent assessment of the need for judicial
intervention by the Supreme Court in the politics of affirmative action
can avoid the unpleasant collateral consequences that may be produced by the Supreme Court's occupation of the Nation's race relations policy. One basis for hope stems from the fact that the Supreme
Court did eventually learn to overcome its imprudent political interventions during the Lochner era.
2.

Like Lochner

The Lochner era, which lasted from 1905 to 1937, has come to
symbolize inappropriate Supreme Court usurpations of political policymaking power from the representative branches of government.25 1
By the end of the Lochner era, even the Court itself had come to
realize that the political branches were institutionally more competent
than the politically unaccountable judiciary to formulate social policy
affecting economic regulation.2 52 Nevertheless, the contemporary
Court continues to usurp policymaking power in some substantive ar250. See Duncan Kennedy, Iraq: The Case for Losing, 31 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 667 (2006)
(discussing problems caused by U.S. invasion of Iraq, and predicting face-saving U.S. withdrawal
that will appropriately leave U.S. with reduced international influence).
251. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at
750-62 (describing rise and fall of Lochner era).
252. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 750-62.

2007]

Howard Law Journal
eas by cementing its own policy preference into imprecise provisions
of the Constitution. It then uses the power of judicial review to substitute those policy preferences for representative branch actions of
which the Supreme Court disapproves. Unfortunately, the regulation
of affirmative action has remained one of the substantive areas in
which the Court has practiced this form of judicial activism. Hopefully, however, the Court will come to realize that the lesson of Lochner applies in the sphere of affirmative action just as forcefully as it
applied in the sphere of economic regulation.
In Lochner v. New York, 53 the Supreme Court invalidated a New
York statute that imposed maximum-hours restrictions on the amount
of time that bakers could work in a given day or a given week.25 4
Lochner held that the effort by the New York legislature to implement
this form of health and safety regulation was unconstitutional because
it violated the due process liberty rights of bakers and their employers
to enter into the labor contracts that they desired. 25 5 Lochner, therefore, came to stand for the constitutionalization of freedom of contract as an essential component of laissez-faire capitalism. For the
next thirty years, the Supreme Court frequently invalidated economic
regulations adopted by the representative branches of government, on
the ground that those regulations violated the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution. The Lochner era invalidations had the effect of frustrating the ability of politically accountable policymakers to implement what they deemed to be prudent public policies, because the
Supreme Court wanted to protect the economic beneficiaries of Social
Darwinism and free market capitalism from the redistributive effects
of legislative action.2 56
After the 1929 Depression generated widespread skepticism
about the benefits of unregulated free market economics, the Lochner
era finally came to an end. In 1934, the Supreme Court decided
Nebbia v. New York,2 57 where it upheld legislatively enacted milk
price supports. Then, in 1937, the Court decided West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish,2 58 where it upheld a minimum wage law for women. Although both the Nebbia and Parrishstatutes violated the free market
principle of Lochner, the Supreme Court had by then come to recog253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

198
See
See
See
291
300

U.S. 45 (1905).
id. at 52-53, 64-65 (describing and invalidating maximum hours restriction).
id. at 64-65 (invalidating statute).
STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 750-55 (discussing criticisms of Lochner).
U.S. 502, 537-39 (1934).
U.S. 379, 397-400 (1937).
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nize the imprudence of substituting its own economic preferences for
the economic policies adopted by the representative branches of government. The Lochner era is now widely discredited. 259 But unfortunately, the Court has yet to recognize the imprudence of substituting
its own racial preferences for the racial policies adopted by the representative branches.
The lesson of Lochner is that the Supreme Court's lack of political accountability makes it ill-suited to formulate social policy. Judicial
review may arguably be appropriate when the Court is protecting a
right that is clearly established in the Constitution. But when the
Court is merely using abstract constitutional language as a vehicle to
convey its own policy preferences, judicial biases and predispositions
are likely to cause the Court to make a mistake in formulating appropriate social policies. The Court was guilty of such a mistake in the
context of economic regulation throughout the thirty years of the
Lochner era. It has been guilty of such a mistake in the context of
racial regulation throughout its entire history. The only constitutional
basis for the Court's repeated interventions in the formulation of racial policy is the abstract phrase "equal protection" contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 260 Because that phrase simply begs the
question of what equality requires, it provides no more basis for invalidating racial affirmative action than the phrase "due process" did for
invalidating economic regulation in Lochner.2 6 ' The Supreme Court,
therefore, lacks the institutional competence to supplant legislative
262
determinations about appropriate affirmative action policy.
There is a disturbing irony in the Supreme Court's refusal to apply the lesson of judicial restraint that it learned in Lochner to the
process of formulating affirmative action racial policy. The onslaught
of the Depression in 1929 ultimately convinced the Supreme Court to
recognize the dangers inherent in judicial usurpations of legislative
power. Dramatic economic upheavals challenged the validity of laissez-faire economic theories and highlighted the lack of institutional
competence exhibited by a Supreme Court that had placed those the259. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 750 (noting that Lochner is widely condemned).
260. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (containing Equal Protection Clause).
261. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (1905) (invoking Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment as basis for invalidation of statute at issue).
262. For a fuller discussion of my views concerning the relative institutional competence of
the Supreme Court and the representative branches in formulating racial policy see Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, supra note 34, at 634-41.
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ories beyond the reach of legislative modification. 263 The irony stems
from the fact that many racial minorities presently suffer economic
disadvantages so severe that they are analogous to the disadvantages
suffered by Whites during the Depression.2 64 The disproportionate
harms that racial minorities suffered in the wake of hurricane Katrina
provide a dramatic recent example, 265 but racial minorities have always been economically more disadvantaged than Whites.2 6 6
Although the prudent use of affirmative action might ameliorate
many of the economic harms suffered by racial minorities, the Supreme Court has not itself internalized those harms. As a result, the
Court has not identified the harms suffered by racial minorities as sufficiently pressing to warrant affirmative action remedies. Instead, it
has treated those harms as merely marginal-in much the same way
that it treated the harms suffered by bakers and other oppressed
workers as marginal during the Lochner era. I fear that the reason the
Supreme Court has been unable to internalize or identify with the
harms suffered by racial minorities is precisely because those harms
are suffered by racial minorities rather than Whites. That is not only
consistent with the Court's history of racial insensitivity, 267 but the
Court's political insulation places it above any vicarious internalization that might otherwise be provided by electoral accountability.
Once again, the emergence of terrorism as an international problem might be instructive. A useful goal of judicial review-especially
judicial review undertaken in the name of protecting individual
rights-should be to help detect and remedy social problems before
they become intolerably acute. If those who feel victimized by oppressive social practices perceive that the harms they suffer will continue to go unrecognized, they may conclude that they have no
alternative but to engage in destabilizing activities as a means of em263. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 755-62 (discussing end of Lochner era).
264. See, e.g., Orlando Patterson, The Paradoxof Integration: Why Whites and Blacks Seem
So Divided, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 1995, at 24-27 (describing, inter alia, Depression-level poverty and unemployment for Blacks, which greatly exceeds unemployment and poverty for
Whites).
265. See Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in
America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 454-78 (2006) (discussing cultural reaction to salient
racial injustices in aftermath of Hurricane Katrina); Emma Coleman Jordan, The Invisible Citizens of Hurricane Katrina:The Market Model of Rescue of The Poor in Natural Disasters,GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y (forthcoming) (same).
266. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing statistics showing
disadvantages suffered by racial minorities).
267. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing history of Supreme Court hostility to racial minority
interests).
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phasizing and externalizing the magnitude of their plight. In the past,
racial minorities have engaged in mild versions of social disorder,
ranging from civil rights sit-ins to more disruptive urban riots.2 6 8 One
thing that has been noteworthy about the riots that have occurred to
date is that the personal injury and property damage they inflicted has
been confined primarily to minority communities. 269 But eventually,
disaffected minorities may be recruited by more ambitious organizers-this time to cause disruptions in White neighborhoods, or to
engage in activities that are even more disruptive. Analogous recruiting techniques have been effective for international terrorist leaders,
who have even convinced suicide bombers to become martyrs for the
causes that they espouse. Accordingly, if Justice O'Connor's twentyfive year window of opportunity for affirmative action is permitted to
remain open by the newly constituted Supreme Court, it makes sense
to use that time wisely. It should be used in an effort to convince the
Court to help avert problems that can lead to domestic disruption,
rather than to continue serving as a potential cause of those problems.
B.

Affirmative Inaction

Rather than invalidating affirmative action programs adopted by
the political branches of government, the Supreme Court should decline to review those programs in the same way that it declines to
review other political questions. The Court's lack of political policymaking competence makes that conclusion seem reasonably clear.
What is less clear, however, is how a Court with the historical habit of
favoring Whites over racial minorities can be led to see the wisdom of
that conclusion. Although the Supreme Court normally possesses the
raw power of judicial review, it does not possess the power to make its
policies culturally acceptable. That is a power that is inherently retained by the culture itself. There are certain doctrinal measures that
the culture can take to limit the Supreme Court's policymaking power,
even in the realm of constitutional adjudication. But those measures
are only incidental to the underlying power that the culture possesses
to establish its own normative values. If the culture genuinely desires
to promote racial equality through the use of affirmative action, the
Supreme Court will have no choice but to comply. The Supreme
268. See KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 247, at 242-316 (discussing civil rights sit-ins, demonstrations and riots).
269. See, e.g., id. at 279-82, 288-91 (discussing riots in Black urban areas including Harlem,
Watts, Detroit, and Washington, DC).
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Court is but a functionary of the culture. It is the culture itself that
supplies the moral guidance.
1. Doctrinal Measures
As a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court is subservient to the
normative values of the political culture. The power of judicial review
gives the Court the ability to invalidate acts of the political branches
of government, but that power is necessarily provisional. When the
Court acts in a manner that is inconsistent with the culture's understanding of its own core ideals, there are doctrinal measures that the
culture can take to constrain the Court's excesses. Those measures are
rooted in separation-of-powers concerns, and in the recognition that
the operational meaning of a culture's normative values is ultimately
political.
The power of Supreme Court judicial review is nowhere written
into the Constitution. Rather, it emanates from the Supreme Court's
2 70
own declaration of that power's existence in Marbury v. Madison.
Likewise, the view that the Supreme Court is the final expositor of
constitutional meaning is also absent from the Constitution. It derives
from a similar Supreme Court proclamation of judicial supremacy in
Cooper v. Aaron.271 Although the political culture has largely acquiesced in those pronouncements of power, Marbury itself imposed limits on the scope of judicial review. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
recognized the existence of political questions, whose resolution was
constitutionally committed to the representative branches notwithstanding the power of judicial review.2 7 2 The precise contours of the
political question doctrine are often elusive.27 3 However, the functional nature of a political question is easy to understand. A political
question is simply a question whose proper resolution lies within the
institutional competence of the representative branches, rather than
within the institutional competence of the Supreme Court. For the

270. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 36-42 (discussing
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury).
271. 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 57-60 (discussing
judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation).
272. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) at 170 (disclaiming jurisdiction over questions that are
"in their nature political").
273. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 119-58 (discussing political question doctrine).
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reasons that have been stated,2 74 the policy desirability of racial affirmative action is best understood as a political question.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has viewed the policy issues
surrounding affirmative action as judicial questions rather than political questions. Nevertheless, constitutional doctrine provides means
by which the political branches can reclaim control over the formulation of affirmative action policy. As I have discussed elsewhere,2 7 5
this can be done in either moderate or more forceful ways. Adopting
a moderate strategy, the reclamation of control over affirmative action policy can be pursued within the racial regulatory framework established by the Supreme Court through the adoption of policies that
fall between the cracks left by the Court's doctrinal oversight of affirmative action.27 6 More forcefully, this reclamation of policymaking
control can also be pursued by confronting the Supreme Court's usurpations of racial policymaking power directly.2 77
Within the Court's existing regulatory framework, it might be
possible to salvage some affirmative action programs by capitulating
to the Supreme Court's regulatory restrictions. Grutter suggests that it
may still be possible for an affirmative action program to satisfy strict
scrutiny.2 78 But as Gratz indicates, the difference between programs
that are constitutional and those that are unconstitutional can be extremely subtle.2 79 Because of this doctrinal uncertainty, the way in
which affirmative action is packaged may end up being dispositive.
Accordingly, the holistic consideration of race in an effort to promote
educational diversity may be constitutionally permissible, whereas the
use of programs that look more mechanical than holistic may not.2 8 °
274. See supra, notes 259-267 and accompanying text (discussing relative institutional competence of the Supreme Court and the representative branches).
275. These doctrinal techniques are described more fully in Neutralizing Grutter, supra note
34, at 646-68.
276. See id. at 646-56 (discussing moderate strategies for marginalizing Supreme Court).
277. See id. at 656-57 (discussing more confrontational strategies for marginalizing Supreme
Court).
278. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343-44 (2003) (holding that Michigan law school program survived strict scrutiny).
279. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-76 (2003) (finding that Michigan undergraduate program
failed to satisfy strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly-tailored); see also Spann, The Dark
Side of Grutter, supra note 34, at 242-49 (arguing that there is no analytical distinction between
the Supreme Court decision upholding law school affirmative action program in Grutter and the
Supreme Court decision invalidating undergraduate affirmative action program in Gratz);
Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, supra note 34, at 652-56 (suggesting that Grutter and Gratz programs are indistinguishable in their efforts to promote racial balance).
280. See The Dark Side of Grutter, supra note 34, at 242-49 (discussing holistic consideration
of race); Neutralizing Grutter, supra note 34, at 652-56 (same).
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Similarly, programs that are described as promoting diversity may
now have a higher chance of surviving strict scrutiny than programs
that are described as remedies for past discrimination. 8 '
Efforts to identify weak spots in the Court's opposition to affirmative action are complicated by the fact that Justice O'Connor's departure from the Court makes future doctrinal rules less than
certain. 282 Therefore, a supplemental capitulation strategy might be
use race-neutral factors that correlate with race as a basis for affirmative action. Factors such as present economic disadvantage, proven
ability to overcome past hardships, use of English as a second language, or even political preference may serve as proxies that can camouflage the consideration of race in permissible affirmative action
programs.2 83 Although such a tacit racial motivation might at first
blush seem disingenuous or problematic under the Washington v. Davis test for intentional discrimination,2 84 the racial equality goal lying
behind facially neutral affirmative action is no more disingenuous or
problematic than the racial motivation behind Supreme Court doctrines that purport to be race-neutral while deliberately preserving the
existing regime of White privilege.2 8 5
The use of capitulation strategies that rely on racial proxies or
camouflaged intent may provide marginal benefits for affirmative action, but they still leave in place an existing regulatory paradigm in
which judicial review permits the Supreme Court to retain the final
say over the constitutionality of affirmative action. However, the political culture can challenge that existing paradigm by using more assertive measures. Vocal political opposition to Supreme Court
policies can dramatically affect the Court's subsequent adherence to
disfavored policies. Perhaps the most well-known example of Supreme Court submission to political opposition is provided by the
Court's retreat from its hostility to New Deal economic reforms in

281. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-25 (adopting Justice Powell's preference in Bakke for diversity, rather than remedies for past discrimination, as a basis for permissible affirmative action).
282. See Biskupic supra note 44 (discussing new Supreme Court Justices).
283. See Neutralizing Grutter,supra note 34, at 646-56 (discussing proxies for race).
284. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (adopting intentional discrimination standard for discrimination under Equal Protection Clause); cf. Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (holding that mere awareness of known
discriminatory effects was not sufficient to satisfy intent requirement of Equal Protection
Clause).
285. See supra Part II (discussing invidious use of concept of equality).
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response to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's proposed Court-packing plan. 8 6
Even when public opinion is not championed by a political leader
as powerful as the President of the United States, it can be effective
when it is focused and expressed in a manner that is forceful enough
to threaten the Court's perceived legitimacy. Accordingly, the threat
of popular opposition caused the post-Brown Court to tolerate Virginia's plainly unconstitutional miscegenation statute in Naim v.
Naim. 28 7 Likewise, the threat of massive Southern resistance caused
the Court to delay for a decade its implementation of Brown's desegregation requirement after the "all deliberate speed" gloss of Brown
11.288 The introduction of jurisdiction stripping legislation that would
bar the Court from ruling on affirmative action cases, as well as the
introduction of constitutional amendments that would expressly authorize affirmative action, might have a similar effect on the Court's
future rulings. Even if such measures were not actually enacted, the
Court might well respond to the political pressure that they represented. Jurisdiction stripping and proposed amendment strategies
have been used in the past to express political opposition to busing,
and they may be part of the reason that public schools remain largely
segregated today. 8 9 Symmetrical use of such strategies might, therefore, be appropriate this time to promote rather than to frustrate racial equality. In addition, current constitutional amendment proposals
would ban same sex marriage, prohibit flag burning, and block removal of the phrase "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance.2 9 °
The substantive goal of protecting the ability of the political branches
286. See STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 198-200 (discussing Court-packing plan).
287. See sources cited supra note 64 (discussing Naim v. Naim litigation).
288. See Brown I1, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (tempering effect of Brown I by declining to
order immediate school desegregation, and instead requiring desegregation "with all deliberate
speed"); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 20, at 482-88 (discussing delay in desegregation after
Brown II).
289. See Neutralizing Grutter, supra note 34, at 660-61 (discussing political use of proposed
jurisdiction-stripping legislation and constitutional amendments).
290. See Scott Dodson, The Peculiar Federal Marriage Amendment, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783,
783-85 (2004) (discussing proposed Federal Marriage Amendment that would ban same-sex marriage); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of
Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 691-95 (1996) (discussing proposed constitutional
amendments concerning balanced budget, term limits, flag burning, line-item veto, abolition of
electoral college, prohibitions on abortion, prohibitions on busing, and school prayer); Michael
McGough, One (Indoctri)nation Under God: Defenders of the Pledge of Allegiance Should Be
Upfront about Their Intentions, Prrr. POsT-GAZEtrE, Sept. 20, 2004, at A17 (discussing proposed amendments to preserve "under God" in Pledge of Allegiance).
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to promote racial equality through affirmative action would seem to
be at least as important as those largely symbolic amendments.
If all else fails, political opposition to the Supreme Court's racial
policies can be expressed by largely ignoring the Court. If political
players continue to adopt affirmative action programs with even figleaf arguments to support their asserted distinctions from previously
invalidated programs, the courts will have a continuous flow of affirmative action plans that they will have to review and rule upon. Aside
from the judicial fatigue that such a volume of cases will produce, the
Supreme Court may come to appreciate the strength of the opposition
that exists to its anti-affirmative action policies. This, in turn, may
cause the Court to modify those polices. That is arguably what happened in response to the barrage of redistricting cases that were filed
in the wake of the Shaw v. Reno decision requiring strict scrutiny of
majority-minority voting districts following the 1990 Census. After
being inundated with Shaw-based legal challenges, the Court appears
ultimately to have concluded that its anti-affirmative action policy in
the redistricting context had proved too burdensome to be prudent.
As a result, it chose to uphold as permissible political gerrymanders
plans that were realistically indistinguishable from those that it had
previously invalidated as racial gerrymanders.2 9 1
I do not wish to sound naive. All of the capitulation and confrontation strategies that I have described do require a high degree of coherent and coordinated political opposition to the Court's antiaffirmative action policies. And it remains to be seen whether the
requisite political will exists to use affirmative action as a means of
promoting racial equality and resource allocation parity in the face of
Supreme Court opposition. More than is commonly acknowledged,
however, a major component of political power may end up being all
in our heads.
2.

Mind Over Matter

The White majority has historically possessed enough power to
control most domestic political events. However, racial minorities
also possess considerable political power. They possess political
power when they join forces with sympathetic Whites. But they also
possess sufficient power when acting alone to control their own politi291. See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text (discussing redistricting challenges following 1990 Census).
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cal agendas. As the White population approaches that point in the
near future when it will no longer constitute a numerical majority in
the United States, the relative political power of racial minorities
should increase even more.292 Nevertheless, the ability of minorities
to capitalize on their political power will turn on the ability of minorities to act collectively. If minority political power remains fragmented
and dispersed, an unsympathetic White minority can continue to command a disproportionate share of resources by acting as a dominant
political plurality. Ironically, it can do this most effectively by using
the hegemony of race neutrality as a divisive impediment to the formation of durable minority coalitions. Accordingly, the degree of political power possessed by racial minorities in the future is likely to be
determined by two things: the degree to which racial minorities perceive their collective interests to be more important than their discrete
parochial interests; and the degree to which racial minorities are able
to free themselves from the influence of the culture's hegemonic neutrality rhetoric that deters them from forming race-conscious alliances.
Fostering divisiveness among racial minorities has been a common and effective technique for promoting White domination over
racial minorities. Harriett Beecher Stowe illustrated the use of this
technique in her novel Uncle Tom's Cabin,2 93 where Black slaves were
sometimes used as overseers by White slave owners, because Black
overseers were more brutal than White overseers in their efforts to
control Black slaves. In addition, Black overseers were sometimes
paired and pitted against each other in the competition for approval
and favors from their White owners; Black overseers were sometimes
rewarded for their control of other Black slaves with gifts of unwilling
Black female slaves; and the Black slaves themselves were sometimes
forced to compete against each other for the limited resources that
their White owners made available.29 1 More recently, one of the ways
that the White minority maintained the regime of apartheid in South
Africa was by officially dividing the population into four distinct racial
classifications-White, Black, Asian, and Coloured. The White minority then fostered divisiveness both among non-White racial groups,
and within various "tribes" of the Black racial group, for the purpose
292. See Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in
Higher Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 242 (2006) (noting that, in less than a generation,
Whites will no longer constitute a majority of the population in the U.S.).
293. See HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN; OR, LIFE AMONG THE LOWLY
398-407 (Viking Press ed. 1982) (1852).
294. See id. at 350-59 (describing divisiveness that owners induced among slaves).
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of preventing the formation of coalitions among non-Whites that
could challenge the power of the White minority.2 9 5 Similarly, when
White Germans and Belgians colonized the African nation of
Rwanda, they fostered such severe divisiveness between the previouslystable Hutu and Tutsi groups of Black Rwandans that racial frictions eventually led to a civil war, and to one of the worst episodes of
racial genocide in recent history.2 96
Contemporary culture's consignment of disadvantaged minorities
to substandard neighborhoods, segregated schools, undesirable jobs,
and racially identifiable voting districts seems similarly divisive. Like
the consignment of Blacks to South African "homelands, 2 9 7 the current "American Apartheid '2 98 forces racial minorities to compete
with each other-rather than with Whites-for the limited economic,
political and social resources that Whites make available to racial minorities. And the strategy appears to be working. Tensions often run
quite high among racial minority groups, such as the tensions that
299
have existed in recent decades among Blacks, Latinos and Asians.
Tensions also exist among Black subcultural groups, based upon
things like shade of complexion,3 °0 or whether Blacks are of African,
Caribbean, or other descent.30 '
Additional tensions often exist between White and minority subcultural groups whose histories of oppression should make them natural allies. Blacks and Jews sometimes exhibit animosity toward one
295. See JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STATE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: Tr ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH 219-29 (1982) (discussing White minority efforts to promote racial and "tribal" divisions in South Africa); IRA GOLDIN, MAKING
RACE: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF COLOURED IDENTITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 233-44 (1987)
(same); MICHAEL MACDONALD, WHY RACE MATFERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 15-16, 66, 70, 77, 10006, 115-19 (2006) (same); LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 170-77, 158-86,
190-99, 204-13 (1995) (same).
296. See BRUCE D. JONES, PEACEMAKING IN RWANDA: THE DYNAMICS OF FAILURE 16-20,
35-38, 39-41, 43-47 (2001) (discussing European efforts to promote racial divisions in Rwanda).
297. See CELL, supra note 295, at 72-81, 220 (discussing homelands and reserves); MACDONALD, supra note 295, at 12-13 (same); THOMPSON, supra note 295, at 169-72, 191-96 (same).
298. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 156 (discussing concept of urban residential "hyper-

segregation" in United States).
299.

See, e.g., Charles C. Hardy & Steven A. Chin, L.A. Race Tensions: A Picture of Fear,

S.F. EXAMINER, May 10, 1992, at Al (discussing racial tensions among Blacks, Latinos, and
Asians); Race Relations in Los Angeles: Puffs of Racial Steam, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 89

(same).
300. See, e.g., Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487
(2000) (discussing intra-racial discrimination based on skin color).
301. See, e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, Who Is Black Enough for You: The Stories of One Black
Man and His Family's Pursuit of the American Dream, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 97 (1996) (discussing intra-racial frictions resulting form intersectional racial identity).
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another, °2 as do the United States Palestinians and Jews who identify
with their own membership groups concerning the continuing conflict
that exists in the Middle East.30 3 That is particularly disturbing when
one remembers that Jews themselves used to be considered a racial
minority group.30 4 Moreover, in the post 9/11 environment, where
heightened security concerns have also generated heightened levels of
xenophobic animosity, United States racial minorities sometimes endorse and engage in hostility to Arab or Muslim groups. They do so
even though their own present and historical experiences with unjust
racial stereotypes should have taught them to know better.30 5
Human beings appear to be a self-interested species. We are concerned primarily with our own welfare and the welfare of the membership and reference groups with whom we identify. Our selfinterest is expressed in diverse ways, ranging from school spirit; to
hometown pride; to vigorous support of our favorite sports teams; to
the intensity of our "red" and "blue" political party affiliations. We
succumb to the nationalistic patriotism that our governmental leaders
demand from us as a way of suppressing dissent from their efforts to
export "democracy" to the rest of the world. And we persist in the
notion that God should bless America. Accordingly, we are inclined
to adopt beliefs such as the view that foreign countries are obligated
to sell their oil to us at reasonable prices, but that we are justified in
prohibiting foreign countries from buying our advanced computer encryption technology at any price-simply because we are us, and they
are merely them. 3 6 All of this seems disturbingly reminiscent of the
color wars that we used to play in summer camp.
302. See, e.g., Julian Bond, Introduction, in MAURIANNE ADAMS & JOHN H. BRACEY,
STRANGERS & NEIGHBORS 1-13 (1999) (discussing natural alliance and racial tensions that have

existed in Black-Jewish relations).
303. See, e.g., Sam McManis, Conversations in the Crossfire: Dialogue Groups Bring Palestinians, Jews Together in Lafayette, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17, 2000, at I (discussing tensions between
domestic Jews and Palestinians).
304. See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HisTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 103 (2005) (noting that
"[aifter the First World War, [Jews] often were classified with Blacks as a racial minority.").
305. See Manning Marable, Racism in a Time of Terror, 4 SoULs 1, 11-12 (2002) (discussing
complex social forces that cause some Blacks to acquiesce in post-9/11 discriminatory imposition
of burdens on Arabs and Muslims).
306. Compare Charles Krauthammer, The Tehran Calculus, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006, at
A19 (expressing fear that U.S. military action to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons
might cause Iran to trigger worldwide recession by suspending export of oil), with 65 Fed. Reg.
2492-2502 (Jan. 14, 2000) (codified in scattered portions of 15 C.F.R. chap. 7) (Export Administration rules relaxing restrictions on export of computer encryption technology, but retaining
restrictions for export to terrorist countries, including Iran).
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Not surprisingly, the racially correlated competition for resources
that seems inevitable in contemporary culture can be understood as
yet another outgrowth of our commitment to self interest. Whites feel
cheated if resources are channeled to racial minorities, and racial minorities feel cheated if Whites continue to demand a disproportionate
share of those resources. Moreover, individual racial minority groups
are willing to compete with each other for limited resources, while
basing their sense of self-interested identity on shared subcultural or
ethnic differences. Although racial minorities seem more than willing
to accept the invitation to compete with each other for resources, they
seem less willing to demand a larger share of the resources that are
presently allocated to Whites. What racial minorities sometimes seem
not to realize is that they themselves have considerable control over
the degree to which they view their own interests as unitary or
discrete.
A lot has been written about multiculturalism and identity politics.3" 7 While much of that scholarship has been controversial, there
now seems to be a widely shared consensus that race itself is not a
biologically significant category, but is instead a socially constructed
concept.30 8 That means that the culture in general, and racial minorities in particular, can decide how they want to define the concept of
race. Racial categories can be defined narrowly and divisively in a
way that continues to benefit Whites, as racial categories were defined
under the apartheid regime of South Africa.3" 9 Alternatively, racial
categories can be defined at a higher level of generality, in a way that
is likely to benefit racial minorities by emphasizing the collective interests that racial minorities share. In this regard, it is noteworthy that
one of the political strategies that some South African racial minorities adopted to resist the apartheid regime was to reject the Black,
Coloured, and Asian racial categorizations attributed to them by the
White minority. As an act of racial solidarity, many non-White South
Africans chose to view themselves as Black, notwithstanding the dif-

307. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND
405-13 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing critical race theory, multiculturalism and identity
politics).
308. See id. at 387-95 (discussing social construction of race).
309. See CELL, supra note 295, at 220 (discussing racial classifications); MACDONALD, supra
note 295, at 45-46 (same).
PERSPECTIVES

680

[VOL.

50:611

Affirmative Inaction
ferent designations imposed upon them by the White South African
government. 1 °
One way that Whites have been able to retain their dominance in
the allocation of resources is by using the hegemony of race neutrality
to deter collective action by diverse racial minorities. Spearheaded by
the Supreme Court's insistence on a colorblind conception of equality,
the White majority is able to characterize race-based efforts to build
minority coalitions as somehow inappropriate and un-American. That
sort of race consciousness is said to be inconsistent with the colorblind
aspirations of the United States Constitution.1 1 Ironically, efforts to
unify the interests of diverse racial minorities are themselves characterized as divisive, because they are potentially antagonistic to
Whites.3 12 As a result, eminently sensible and non-divisive strategies,
such as the pursuit of equality through the promotion of racial balance, become "patently unconstitutional. 31 3 However, racial minorities can overcome this otherwise disabling impediment to minority
collective action simply by ceasing to believe in the normative desirability of race neutrality. Supreme Court moral pronouncements and
abstract cultural rhetoric will cease to be effective constraints on minority political cooperation once they cease to be believed.
In an effort to boost broadcast ratings by capitalizing on the competitive nature of our "ethnic pride," CBS decided to structure its fall
2006 reality TV show, Survivor: Cook Islands, as a "social experiment." The show initially pitted White, Black, Asian, and Latino
"tribes" against each other in a mock struggle for survival, after being
stranded on a remote island.3 14 Consistent with the show's summer
310. See GOLDIN, supra note 295, at xxv-xxvii (noting that "[m]any Africans, Asians and
Coloureds, particularly following the rise of Black consciousness ideologies in the early 1960s,
when using racial categorisation define themselves simply as 'Black.' ");LEONARD THOMPSON &
ANDREW PRIOR, SOUTH AFRICAN PoLITIcS 201-09 (1982) (discussing efforts to combat
apartheid through unified Black identity encompassing all non-White South African racial
groups).
311. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1948) (emphasizing personal constitutional
right to race-neutral treatment); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (emphasizing need for strict
scrutiny to protect personal right to race neutral treatment).
312. See e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (suggesting that Black-controlled City Council sacrificed White interests in order to advance Black interests).
313. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-30 (holding that pursuit of racial balance would be a "patently unconstitutional" effort to impose racial quotas).
314. See Lisa de Morales, Sagging "Survivor" Plays the Race Card, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,
2006, at C1 (describing Survivor TV show); Wikipedia, Survivor: Cook Islands, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Survivor:-Cook-Islands (last visited on Sept. 23, 2006) (same); Edward Wyatt
& Stuart Elliott, G.M. Drops "Survivor" but Says Racial Format Isn't the Reason, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2006, at C3 (same).
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camp heritage, the name of each tribe, of course, corresponded to a
color.3 15 As CBS presumably intended, the racial competition idea
was sufficiently striking to generate considerable public notice. Much
of the ensuing controversy was based on the fear that the show would
be racially divisive, with each group trying to advance its own interests
at the expense of the other racial groups.3 1 6 Not surprisingly, much of
the opposition came from racial minorities, whom history has taught
to feel threatened by the dangers of racial confrontation. 317 Ultimately, the racially segregated format was abandoned after the first
two weeks of the show.3 18 In the midst of all the controversy, however, the one fear that I never saw expressed was the fear that the
racial minority groups on the island would choose to combine forces
in an effort to defeat the White group. And that strikes me as sad.
Aside from fostering racial tensions among various subcultural
minority groups, the White majority has shown little interest in distinctions among racial minorities. The "one drop rule" of hypodescent cared nothing about mixed racial heritage, but viewed all
people with even one drop of Black blood as Black for legal purposes
relating to slavery.3 19 Miscegenation statutes prohibited intermarriage
between Whites and members of all racial minority groups, but imposed no prohibitions whatsoever on intermarriage between racial minority group members themselves. 320 And although most members of
even contemporary United States culture have views about the appropriate treatment of Indians, or Asians, or Latinos, few have much inclination or ability to distinguish among the tribal or national origins
of the individual members of those groups.
For many purposes, racial minority groups are largely a monolithic "other," characterized most strongly by the fact that they are not
White. But ironically, in a culture that has historically cared much
more about the distinction between Whites and racial minorities than
315. See Survivor: Cook Islands, supra note 314 (describing names of tribes).
316. See Sagging "Survivor", supra note 314; Wikipedia, supra note 314; Wyatt & Elliott,
supra note 314 (discussing controversy).
317. See Survivor: Cook Islands, supra note 314 (describing call by New York City Council's
Black, Latino, and Asian Caucus for CBS to refrain from broadcasting show).
318. See Lisa de Morales, "Ugly Betty" Looks Pretty Fantasticto ABC, WASH. POST, Sept 30,
2006, at C1 (describing abandonment of initial format).
319. See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,African
Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1163-71 (1997) (discussing "one drop
rule" of hypodescent).
320. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12 (1967) (discussing Virginia statute prohibiting miscegenation only among Whites); see also sources cited supra note 118 (discussing history of Naim v.
Naim and Loving).
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it has cared about distinctions among racial minority groups, racial
minorities themselves have not yet been able to take advantage of
their shared identity in a way that might advance their own collective
interests. Whites manage to think of racial minorities as unitary for
the purpose of engaging in discrimination, but racial minorities cannot
seem to think of themselves as unitary for the purpose of fighting discrimination. When all is said and done, perhaps the primary advantage
that the White majority has over racial minorities is its power to dictate the meaning of race in United States culture. Even at this late
date, it seems that minorities continue to internalize only the racial
identities that the White majority chooses to ascribe to them.
CONCLUSION
Now, as in the past, the Supreme Court continues to serve as a
major impediment to the cause of racial justice in the United States.
It does this by propounding normative standards of racial "equality"
that have the effect of preserving the many advantages that Whites
have over racial minorities in the allocation of economic, political, and
social resources. Most recently, the Court has done this by creating a
racial regulatory regime that is hostile to redistributive affirmative action and by intimating that even the few forms of affirmative action
that are now permitted will no longer be permitted in another twentyfive years. Racial minorities, in fact, have the ability to secure meaningful concessions from the White majority by acting within the existing political process. However, a political card game in which the
Supreme Court serves as the dealer, is a game that is being played
with a stacked deck. Accordingly, racial minorities and others interested in racial justice can profitably spend their remaining twenty-five
years trying to marginalize the Court's role in racial policymaking.
The goal of distancing the Supreme Court from the formulation
of racial policy is symmetrically desirable. Historically, the Supreme
Court has taken affirmative measures to ensure political inaction
when the culture has sought to remedy the problem of racial injustice.
To compensate for that history, the culture should now take affirmative measures to ensure judicial inaction when the Supreme Court
seeks to invalidate political remedies for the problem of racial injustice. However, the goal of relegating the Supreme Court to the passive role of observing racial policy from the sidelines may ultimately
prove to be unattainable. The constitutional culture of the United
States is so accustomed to delegating racial issues to the Supreme
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Court that the political culture may not be willing to do the work that
is necessary to reclaim control over the formulation of racial policy.
And that, in turn, may be because the political culture is not yet comfortable with the degree of actual equality that might be produced by
liberating itself from the expedient racial policies of the Supreme
Court.
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